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Whither the Regulatory “War on Coal”? 
Scapegoats, Saviors, and Stock  
Market Reactions 
Cary Coglianese* and Daniel E. Walters** 
Complaints about excessive economic burdens associated with regulation 
abound in contemporary political and legal rhetoric. In recent years, perhaps 
nowhere have these complaints been heard as loudly as in the context of U.S. 
regulations targeting the use of coal to supply power to the nation’s electricity 
system, as production levels in the coal industry dropped by nearly half between 
2008 and 2016. The coal industry and its political supporters, including the 
president of the United States, have argued that a suite of air pollution 
regulations imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency during the 
Obama administration seriously undermined coal companies’ bottom lines, 
presenting an existential threat to the industry. Under the Trump administration, 
industry players have lobbied hard for (and sometimes received) financial 
subsidies and regulatory changes, with the president seemingly all too happy to 
play the role of the industry’s savior. 
Stepping back, we consider the extent to which regulations have really led 
to the decline in demand for coal and how much the coal industry can actually 
expect to gain from the deregulatory policies of the current administration. To 
illuminate these questions, we statistically analyze stock market reactions to 
important events in what critics called the regulatory “war on coal” during the 
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Obama administration. Using an event-study framework that measures 
abnormal market activity in the immediate wake of these events, we are able to 
isolate any potential impact of regulatory developments above and beyond 
market factors, such as secular trends in natural gas prices and market 
performance as a whole. Surprisingly, we find no systemic evidence consistent 
with a “war on coal” based on investor assessments of the industry’s financial 
prospects in the wake of new regulatory developments, even though our methods 
do find evidence of stock market reactions to other events, such as bankruptcies 
of other companies. Coal firms’ investors—the very actors with financial stakes 
in understanding the impact of regulation on the industry—appear to have 
behaved as if they never actually bought into the regulatory “war on coal” 
narrative. 
Our findings are consistent both with broader evidence about the effects of 
regulation and with an underlying political economy of regulatory scapegoating, 
according to which actors in a declining industry prefer to blame regulation 
rather than competitive factors for their businesses’ decline. By calling attention 
to the pervasive incentives for scapegoating and cheap talk by politicians seeking 
to be saviors, we offer an account that can explain the mismatch between our 
findings and the rhetoric of the “war on coal.” Along the way, our account 
reinforces how important it is for courts, elected officials, and the public to 
demand that government agencies base their regulatory decisions on evidence 
instead of relying on political rhetoric. 
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Regulation can improve society by correcting market failures. But in doing 
so, it can also impose costs on industry. As a result, businesses often have an 
incentive to mobilize against the imposition of new regulatory obligations and 
seek the alleviation of existing ones.1 Corporate managers frequently emphasize 
the negative ramifications of regulations, claiming that regulations kill jobs2 and 
place an inordinate drag on the economy.3 Such claims about excessive 
regulatory costs have permeated political discourse, and they hold high strategic 
value for the business leaders who make them.4 Even when specific regulations 
have little or no perceptible impact on firms’ bottom lines, managers still have 
incentives to overstate a regulation’s negative consequences. Exaggerating small 
or nonexistent effects of regulation might be useful in staving off other, more 
stringent or comprehensive regulations that would be truly onerous. 
Exaggeration may also help industry leaders build the case for subsidies, tax 
relief, or forms of tariff protection that would benefit their firms. Blaming 
regulations also can divert attention from business leaders’ own failings and their 
inability to maintain profitability during periods of heightened economic 
competition. 
Perhaps nowhere has the rhetoric of excessive regulatory costs emerged as 
prominently on the political agenda in recent years as it has with environmental 
regulations imposed on electric utility plants that rely on coal as their source of 
 
 1.  See, e.g., JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, 
PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 98 (1991) (noting that “[o]ne of the chief reasons that business 
firms join trade associations, for example, is their desire to secure sympathetic public policies or to mount 
effective defenses against government regulation”). 
 2.  See generally ANNE E. SMITH ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ESTIMATING THE 
EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF REGULATIONS: A REVIEW OF EPA’S METHODS FOR ITS AIR RULES 22 (2013) 
(noting that “regulations cannot perpetually generate positive impacts on jobs in the economy” and 
criticizing the EPA’s job impacts estimates as “illogical”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Mark W. Crain & Nicole V. Crain, The Cost of Federal Regulation to the U.S. 
Economy, Manufacturing, and Small Business, NAT’L ASS’N MFRS. 6 (Sept. 10, 2014), 
https://www.nam.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Federal-Regulation-Full-Study.pdf (asserting that 
regulations impose high costs on businesses). For a critical review of the Crain and Crain study, see 
Richard W. Parker, The Faux Scholarship Foundation of the Regulatory Rollback Movement, 45 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 845 (2018). 
 4.  See generally James W. Coleman, How Cheap Is Corporate Talk? Comparing What Companies 
Tell Regulators with What They Tell Investors, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 47 (2016) (showing that industry 
often engages in “cheap talk” about regulatory compliance costs in financial disclosures to investors and 
financial regulators).  
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energy.5 During the Obama administration, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) issued a suite of rules designed to curb power plants’ emissions 
of mercury and other toxic chemicals, prevent air pollution from power plants 
from drifting across state lines, and limit carbon dioxide emissions from power 
plants in an effort to combat global climate change.6 Industry claimed that these 
rules constituted a veritable regulatory “war on coal.”7 According to executives 
and lobbyists in the coal mining industry, these environmental regulations made 
coal a more costly energy source for electric utilities, prompting a wave of coal-
fired plant retirements that decreased overall demand for coal.8 Coal production 
has, in fact, declined dramatically over the last decade: dropping 38 percent 
between 2008 and 2016.9 At the same time, the coal industry apparently invested 
millions of dollars in a “strategy . . . that urge[d] coal-mining families to join the 
coal and electric power industry in fighting back against the federal 
government’s so-called ‘war on coal.’”10 Coal industry executive Robert Murray 
accused the Obama administration of creating a “regulatory rampage” aimed at 
“appeas[ing] his radical environmentalist, liberal elitist . . . constituents” who 
seek to “destroy” the coal industry.11 
Sympathetic politicians have echoed the coal industry’s claims that air 
pollution regulations have undermined the coal industry. After the Obama 
 
 5.  For a concise history of this rhetoric with respect to coal-powered utility plants, see RICHARD 
L. REVESZ & JACK LIENKE, STRUGGLING FOR AIR: POWER PLANTS AND THE “WAR ON COAL” 1–2, 16–
19 (2016). 
 6.  See id. at 1–2 (identifying the mercury rule, cross-state transport rule, and the CPP as the 
“primary evidence” of the regulatory battle against the coal industry); see also id. at 22–23. 
 7.  See Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695, 695, 773 
(2016); Richard L. Gordon, An EPA War on Coal?, 36 REGULATION 16, 16 (2013); Michael Grunwald, 
Inside the War on Coal, POLITICO (May 26, 2015, 11:45 PM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/ 
2015/05/inside-war-on-coal-000002. Coal companies have filed hundreds of official regulatory comments 
with environmental and natural resources agencies as well as annual financial reports with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission claiming that environmental regulations have had significant effects on the 
economic viability and competitiveness of their industry. See id. 
 8.  See Isaac Orr, Blame Government, not the Market, for Dwindling Coal Industry, THE HILL 
(Dec. 15, 2017, 3:00 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/365137-blame-government-
not-markets-for-dwindling-coal-industry. 
 9.  See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA‐0035(2018/3), MARCH 2018: MONTHLY ENERGY 
REVIEW 99 (2018) [hereinafter EIA 2018]. 
 10.  Patrick McGinley, Collateral Damage: Turning a Blind Eye to Environmental and Social 
Injustice in the Coalfields, 19 J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 304, 309–10 (2013). 
 11.  Robert E. Murray, Remarks at the 37th Annual Coal Marketing Days Conference (Sept. 22, 
2014). Murray Energy entered bankruptcy proceedings in October 2019. Clifford Krauss, Murray Energy 
is 8th Coal Company in a Year to Seek Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/10/29/business/energy-environment/murray-energy-bankruptcy.html. At that time, the company’s 
bankruptcy filings did acknowledge that competition from natural gas had contributed to the firm’s 
financial demise, but a statement filed with the bankruptcy court by the company’s new CEO still 
emphasized that “[f]ederal regulation of emissions increased the cost of coal-fired generation and 
incentivized the installation of gas and renewables generation.” Declaration of Robert D. Moore, 
President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer, of Murray Energy Holdings Co., in 
Support of Chapter 11 Petitions, No. 9-56885 (JEH) In re Murray Energy Holdings Co. (S.D. Ohio Bankr. 
2019) (No. 10). 
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administration announced a plan in 2013 to put in place new climate-related rules, 
then-Speaker of the House John Boehner criticized the proposed policy initiative as 
“essentially a national energy tax and a continuation of the war on coal [that will 
only make matters worse,] putting thousands and thousands of Americans out of 
work.”12 Then-Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell criticized President 
Obama for waging a “war on coal,” charging that new EPA rules were just a “back 
door attempt by President Obama to . . . shut down our nation’s coal mines.”13 As 
a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump railed against “unnecessary 
regulations” and repeatedly pledged to “end the war on coal.”14 Such assertions 
have not been limited to Republican political leaders either, as “Democrats from 
coal mining and processing states have opposed EPA regulatory requirements that 
the politicians claimed would disadvantage U.S. industry.”15 
Just as industry actors have strategic reasons to exaggerate the negative 
consequences of regulation, so too do certain politicians have an incentive to 
exaggerate how much their efforts to reduce regulatory burdens will promote 
industrial activity and job growth. As a candidate and as president, Donald 
Trump has regularly portrayed himself as the coal industry’s savior. In addition 
to his general populist appeals during the campaign—such as his claim that “I 
alone can fix it,” when referring to a governmental system “rigged against our 
citizens”16—Trump also specifically made saving the coal industry one of his 
most prominent campaign promises.17 “I’m coal’s last shot,” he would come to 
say.18 And his message of salvation resonated with voters in certain key coal 
states. In West Virginia and Wyoming, Trump beat Hillary Clinton by a margin 
of roughly three to one in the 2016 presidential election.19 Trump’s electoral 
 
 12.  Richard McGregor, Obama’s ‘War on Coal’ Carries Risks in Battleground States, FIN. TIMES 
(June 26, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/cb2a6450-de79-11e2-b990-00144feab7de. 
 13.  Erica Martinson, Coal in Obama’s Climate Cross Hairs, POLITICO (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/coal-barack-obama-epa-greenhouse-gas-emissions-097104. 
 14.  John W. Miller, Election 2016: Trump Pushes Energy Deregulation, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 
2016, at A4. In debating his Democratic rival in 2016, vice-presidential candidate Mike Pence repeatedly 
blamed “the war on coal and the stifling avalanche of regulation coming out of this administration” for 
economic woes. Daniel White, Read a Transcript of the Vice Presidential Debate, TIME (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://time.com/4517096/vice-presidential-debate-kaine-pence-transcript/; see also RICHARD ANDREWS, 
HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 394 (2020) (stating that “Trump won 
election with sweeping promises to ‘end the war on coal’ and to revitalize mining and manufacturing 
across the coal-driven industrial states of Appalachia and the Midwest that secured his victory”). 
 15.  Howard A. Latin, Climate Change Regulation and EPA Disincentives, 45 ENVTL. L. 19, 40 (2015). 
 16.  Donald J. Trump, Republican Nominee for President of the United States, Address at the 
Republican National Convention (July 21, 2016). 
 17.  See, e.g., John H. Cushman Jr. & Zahra Hirji, Trump: America First on Fossil Fuels, Last on 
Climate Change, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 27, 2016), https://insideclimatenews.org/news
/27052016/donald-trump-republican-party-election-fossil-fuels-coal-oil-gas-fracking-climate-change-
paris (quoting candidate Donald Trump as saying that “[w]e are going to save the coal industry, believe 
me, we are going to save it”). 
 18.  Bill Weir, More Coal-Fired Power Plants Have Closed Under Trump Than in Obama’s First Term, 
CNN (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/07/politics/pennsylvania-coal-plants-weir-wxc/index.html.  
 19.  In 2016, Trump bested Clinton by 2.6 times as many votes in West Virginia and by 3.1 times 
as many votes in Wyoming. West Virginia Results, N.Y. TIMES (last updated June 15, 2018 11:40 AM), 
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victory produced considerable initial optimism in coal states. As a retired miner 
in Gillette, Wyoming stated, “You saw right after the election . . . people with 
smiles on their faces. They finally felt like the albatross was gone . . . .”20 In the 
years to follow, the President and his administration took steps aimed at reducing 
regulatory burdens on coal-powered electricity, including repealing EPA’s Clean 
Power Plan (CPP).21 On announcing the initial steps in that repeal, President 
Trump’s first EPA administrator even declared that “[t]he war on coal is over.”22 
The rhetoric of a regulatory “war on coal” has proven itself politically 
resonant in part because it accords with a certain economic logic. If regulation 
raises the costs of using a product, then that should make the product less 
attractive in the marketplace. Yet regulation is not the only reason that an 
industry such as coal mining could struggle. During the eight years of the Obama 
administration, coal faced other economic challenges, including increased 
competition from natural gas.23 Perhaps much, if not most, of the coal industry’s 
decline derived from these other factors. If so, political rhetoric about a 
regulatory war on the coal industry might merely amount to symbolic speech that 
serves the self-interest of industry leaders and politicians.24 Industry lobbyists 
and leaders would presumably prefer to make regulators in Washington, D.C., 
the scapegoat of what ails their industry rather than take the blame for failing to 
ensure that their line of business remains economically competitive.25 Politicians 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/west-virginia; Wyoming Results, N.Y. TIMES (last 
updated Aug. 1, 2017, 11:22 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/wyoming. 
 20.  Meghan Keneally et al., High Hopes in Coal Country with Trump’s Climate Change Policy, 
ABC NEWS (May 18, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wyoming-coal-miners-high-
hopes-trump-amid-national/story?id=47465051. By July 2019, Revelation Energy had declared bankruptcy 
and closed two of its mines in Gillette. Coal Company Files for Bankruptcy, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 4, 
2019, 5:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/04/738724369/coal-company-files-for-bankruptcy. 
 21.  See Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520, 32,521 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); see also Juliet Eilperin & 
Brady Dennis, Trump EPA Finalizes Rollback of Key Obama Climate Rule that Targeted Coal Plants, 
WASH. POST (June 19, 2019, 11:34 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/trump-
epa-finalizes-rollback-of-key-obama-climate-rule-that-targeted-coal-plants/2019/06/19/b8ff1702-8eeb-
11e9-8f69-a2795fca3343_story.html?utm_term=.391d86ae4ccb. 
 22.  Adam Beam, ‘The War on Coal is Over’: Trump Administration to Terminate Obama-era 
Clean Power Plan, COURIER J. (Oct. 9, 2017, 12:24 PM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/tech/
science/environment/2017/10/09/trump-war-coal-over-terminate-clean-power-plan/746397001/.  
 23.  Steve Cicala, Who’s Waging the War on Coal? Not the U.S. Government, FORBES (Oct. 27, 
2016, 9:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ucenergy/2016/10/27/whos-waging-the-war-on-coal-not-
the-government/. 
 24.  See generally MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1985) (analyzing 
politics, and political discourse, as symbolic forms). 
 25.  For a discussion of how poor business judgments contributed to bankruptcies among major coal 
mining companies, see Heather Richards, Cloud Peak’s $300 Million Mistake, CASPER STAR TRIB. (Apr. 
29, 2019), https://trib.com/business/energy/cloud-peak-s-million-mistake/article_b86fd711-7e0c-5686-a
af1-e756d517ca14.html (noting that “[i]t’s well understood in Wyoming that the state’s biggest coal 
companies got into trouble because they’d taken on debt.”); David Roberts, Coal Left Appalachia 
Devastated. Now It’s Doing the Same to Wyoming, VOX (July 9, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and
-environment/2019/7/9/20684815/coal-wyoming-bankruptcy-blackjewel-appalachia (arguing that “companies 
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seeking votes from workers and their families also benefit if they can make 
themselves appear to be saviors who can simply roll back regulatory burdens and 
thereby revitalize a struggling industry or economy. 
In this Article, we report findings from empirical analysis, seeking to shed 
light on the credibility of the “war on coal” narrative about the role of regulation 
in the decline of the coal industry in the United States. Were environmental 
regulations imposed on the utility sector really instrumental to that decline, as 
the narrative has suggested? Or was regulation essentially just a scapegoat for 
business leaders and a symbol for self-declared political saviors? Some economic 
analysis already indicates that the decline in coal production in fact had much 
more to do with competition from natural gas than from regulation.26 Still, other 
scholars and analysts continue to suggest that environmental regulation poses an 
“existential” threat to the coal industry.27 
This empirical study seeks insight from the signals provided by private 
investors in publicly traded coal firms—those with real money at stake—to see what 
their investment behavior reveals about their expectations of the likely impact of 
environmental regulations on coal firms’ bottom lines. We specifically analyze the 
stock prices of publicly traded coal companies to see how they may have responded 
to news of the relevant regulatory events predominantly associated with the “war 
on coal.” By analyzing investor responses to discrete events associated with the 
development and implementation of key environmental regulations, we seek to 
factor out more secular confounding contributors to coal’s decline, such as falling 
natural gas prices, and then to assess what the market itself might say about the 
impact, if any, of environmental regulation. 
As we detail in the Parts that follow, our statistical analysis shows that the 
stock prices for coal firms responded to certain nonregulatory events, but it 
 
made extraordinarily large and ill-advised bets on metallurgical coal . . . meant for export abroad . . . on 
the assumption that China would grow at its headlong early-2000s pace forever” and, when China did not 
continue at that pace, “those companies—or rather, their employees and shareholders—got hosed”).  
 26.  See, e.g., Charles D. Kolstad, What is Killing the U.S. Coal Industry?, STAN. INST. ECON. POL’Y 
(Mar. 2017), https://siepr.stanford.edu/research/publications/what-killing-us-coal-industry (stating that 
“[w]hat is clear . . . is that environmental regulations did not kill coal”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Adele C. Morris et al., The Risk of Fiscal Collapse in Coal-Reliant Communities 6 
(Columbia Center on Global Energy Policy and Brookings Economic Studies, Working Paper, 2019) 
(arguing that “even a moderately stringent climate policy could create existential risks for the coal 
industry”); Steven Ferrey, Presidential Executive Action: Unilaterally Changing the World’s Critical 
Technology and Infrastructure, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 43, 105–06, 109 (2016) (stating that “[u]nilateral 
executive action to limit various air emissions is transforming fundamental power technology from use of 
coal as its primary input to natural gas and renewable energy in the United States, particularly during the 
past five years. . . . Air regulation is a key wedge on choice of electric technology and infrastructure.”). In 
addition, various analysts and advocates have continued to claim that the Clean Power Plan and other 
climate regulations would severely harm the coal industry. See, e.g., Nick Loris, Why President Trump 
Overhauled Obama’s Coal Emissions Standards, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.
heritage.org/coal-oil-natural-gas/heritage-explains/why-president-trump-overhauled-obamas-coal-
emissions (quoting Heritage Foundation economist Nick Loris as claiming that “[t]he Clean Power 
Plan . . . really would have hurt our existing coal fire power fleet to force them to prematurely retire [and] 
was really an attack on our existing coal generation”). 
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reveals no comparable changes in response to news of environmental regulatory 
events in a manner consistent with the “war on coal” narrative. We find no clear 
evidence that investors saw key developments in the regulatory “war on coal” as 
having meaningful implications for profitability in the coal industry. Overall, it 
would seem as if investors in the stock market perceived something that company 
executives and certain politicians would not have wanted workers or voters to 
understand—namely, that environmental regulation of electric utilities has not 
significantly contributed to the decline of the coal industry. Our research not only 
sheds additional light on the question of regulation’s role in the decline of the 
coal industry in the United States, but it also provides an opportunity for a 
broader reflection on the political economy of regulatory scapegoating, and it 
provides reason to question the extent to which dying industries can be 
reinvigorated through environmental regulatory reforms. 
This Article begins, in Part I, with a descriptive account of the coal industry, 
including its recent decline. We review existing research on the causes of the 
decline, including other studies that, using other data and methods, have raised 
questions about whether regulation explains much of the decreased demand for 
coal as a source of energy. What has remained unexamined in the existing 
literature, though, has been whether regulation affects the expectations of 
investors in the coal industry—and, by extension, what private investors’ 
behavior might imply about the true financial implications of environmental 
regulations on the coal industry in recent years. 
In Part II, we explain our focus on firm-level financial data and outline our 
methods of analyzing these data—an event-study approach supplemented with a 
difference-in-differences analysis of coal’s fortunes vis-à-vis its main 
competitor, natural gas. We explain how we used these widely accepted methods 
to assess the impact of news of regulatory events on the stock market’s 
perceptions about the coal industry’s bottom line. 
In Part III, we report the results obtained from our analysis of stock price 
responses to the EPA regulations underlying claims of a regulatory “war on 
coal.” We also analyze the impacts of other related Obama-era policy initiatives, 
including the Paris Agreement, and we look for possible effects on stock prices 
from decisions in major litigation concerning EPA air pollution regulations. On 
the whole, our analysis suggests that news of environmental regulations and 
policies had no more than highly inconsistent effects on coal companies’ value 
to investors—with no overall discernible pattern supportive of claims of a 
regulatory “war” on the industry. 
In Part IV, we test the robustness of our methods by considering other types 
of events, such as more direct operational rules on coal production, bankruptcies 
within the industry, and the outcomes of presidential elections. We find some of 
these other events associated with statistically significant changes in coal share 
prices. The highly discernible stock price reactions we observe in response to news 
of bankruptcies by other coal firms, for example, show that coal stock prices do 
react to negative events—a finding that both reinforces the appropriateness of our 
2020] WHITHER THE “WAR ON COAL”? 9 
empirical methods and makes the overall nonresponse to news of key events in the 
regulatory “war on coal” narrative all the more noteworthy. 
Finally, in Part V, we address implications for regulatory law of the 
disconnect we find between political rhetoric and market behavior. We offer 
plausible explanations for the seemingly blasé market reaction to news of what 
would have seemed, judging from the political rhetoric, to be an existential 
regulatory threat. Although our analysis of market reactions in this single industry 
cannot be taken to imply that regulation never has any negative effects on industry 
competitiveness or stock market valuation in other contexts, the absence of 
significant market reactions consistent with claims of a regulatory “war on coal” 
does shine light on the strategic incentives that business and political leaders have 
to exaggerate the negative effects of regulation. It is relatively easy for the 
managers of private firms to make regulation a scapegoat for their own inability to 
keep their industry competitive, just as it is relatively easy for politicians to make 
themselves appear to be saviors to struggling workers and their families by offering 
quick fixes in the form of regulatory rollbacks. Given the gulf we observe between 
the heated rhetorical claims and the apparent market realities in this highly salient 
context of energy-related regulation, we urge a degree of caution before accepting 
claims in other contexts about supposedly dire effects of regulation. 
I.  AN INDUSTRY IN DECLINE, BUT WHY? 
 Coal literally fueled the original launch of the U.S. system of electricity 
generation and distribution.28 For most of the last century, coal has been 
abundant and cheap compared to its major competitor fuels, including natural 
gas and renewable energy.29 Although coal combustion requires a relatively high 
level of fixed and capital costs relative to its main competitor, natural gas,30 
analysts continued to project considerable growth for the coal industry as 
recently as the early 2010s.31 The CEO of a major coal company told the Wall 
Street Journal in 2011 that he thought “the next decade for coal is going to be 
one of the best decades we’ve ever had.”32 
 
 28.  The first major electric utility plant in the United States—Pearl Street Station in New York 
City—was coal powered. DAVID TILLMAN, COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY AND EMISSIONS CONTROL 2–5, 53 
(2018); DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 
404–05 (2011). 
 29.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Energy Prices 166 (2020), https://www. eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly
/pdf/sec9.pdf. 
 30.  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2010 with Projections to 2035 67 (Apr. 
2010), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo10/pdf/0383(2010).pdf [hereinafter EIA Outlook 
2010]. 
 31.  Trevor Houser et al., Can Coal Make A Comeback?, CTR. GLOBAL ENERGY POL’Y 7 (Apr. 2017), 
https://energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/Center_on_Global_Energy_Policy_Can_Coal_Make_
Comeback_April_2017.pdf; EIA Outlook 2010, supra note 30, at 94–95; U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual 
Energy Outlook 2012 with Projections to 2035 88 Fig. 96 (June 2012), https://www. eia. gov/outlooks/
archive/aeo12/pdf/0383(2012).pdf [hereinafter EIA Annual Outlook 2012].  
 32.  Joel Millman & Kris Maher, Coal Foes Play China Card, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2011, 12:01 
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703399204576108640399166816. 
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 Between 2008 and 2017, however, the market for coal took an unexpected 
turn. As Figure 1 shows, actual coal production began to tumble from almost 1.2 
billion short tons in 2008 to 728 million short tons in 2016.33 Although coal had 
been steadily losing ground to natural gas and renewables in the market for 
electricity generation since the late 2000s, Figure 1 shows that in 2016, natural 
gas actually eclipsed coal as America’s primary fuel for electricity,34 driven by 
a plentiful supply of cheaper natural gas made possible by the hydraulic 
fracturing (“fracking”) revolution.35 Policymakers began to view natural gas as 
a potential bridge fuel to shift from coal-fired electricity generation to an even-
tual system based on renewable sources of energy.36 By mid-2019, the volume 
 
 
 33.  John Coglianese et al., The Effects of Fuel Prices, Regulations, and Other Factors on U.S. Coal 
Production, 2008-2016, 41 ENERGY J. 55 (2020); Devashree Saha, Trends and Market Forces Shaping 
the Future of U.S. Coal Industry, COUNCIL STATE GOV’TS 2 (Sept. 11, 2017), https://knowledgecenter.
csg.org/kc/system/files/CR_coal.pdf. It appears that the pivotal drop off in coal production occurred after 
2011. Houser et al., supra note 31, at 12 (pointing out that, after 2011, “the bottom fell out” in coal 
production, leading to “the biggest 5-year decline in postwar US history”); see also id. at 7 (describing 
the decline in demand for coal as “one of the most spectacular market collapses in history”). 
 34.  See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Competition Between Coal and Natural Gas Affects Power Markets 
(June 16, 2017), available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31672 (“In 2016, natural gas 
provided 34% of total electricity generation, surpassing coal to become the leading generation source.”). 
 35.  DANIEL RAIMI, THE FRACKING DEBATE: THE RISKS, BENEFITS, AND UNCERTAINTIES OF THE SHALE 
REVOLUTION 161–62 (2018); Karen Palmer et al., The Effect of Natural Gas Supply on Retail Electricity Prices, RESOURCES 
FOR THE FUTURE 1 (Aug. 2012), http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/RFF-IB-12-05.pdf. 
 36.  See Alexander Q. Gilbert & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Benchmarking Natural Gas and Coal-Fired 
Electricity Generation in the United States, 134 ENERGY 622 (2017); Roger Lueken et al., The Climate and 
Health Effects of a USA Switch from Coal to Gas Electricity Generation, 109 ENERGY 1160 (2016). 
Figure 1: Changing Fortunes in the Coal Industry 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
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of electricity provided by renewable energy sources had reached a point that 
rivaled, and in some months exceeded, the volume provided by coal.37 
Around 2008, utilities began increasing the rate of coal-fired power plant 
retirements, and construction of new coal plants virtually ceased even as utilities added 
capacity.38 In many cases, older coal-fired generation units were running at a loss 
and were “over-ripe” for retirement even before the imposition of any additional 
pollution controls.39 With the changing market trends, coal producers found 
themselves with an oversupply problem, “crippling” debt, and a variety of other 
liabilities.40 Reflecting the hard times, three of the biggest and most established 
coal producers—Peabody, Arch, and Alpha—filed for bankruptcy in 2015 and 
2016.41 
Although some of these market dynamics pre-dated the Obama admini-
stration, a steeper decline in coal output coincided with President Obama’s term in 
office. As Figure 1 suggests, as late as 2007, the coal market looked relatively 
stable. Prior to mid-decade, few foresaw just how fundamentally different the coal 
industry—and the larger energy sector—would look by the end of the Obama 
administration. 
A. Explaining Coal’s Decline 
Several research studies have sought to explain coal’s slide. Simplifying 
greatly, at least six general factors have been examined for their possible role in 
coal’s decline since 2008: 
• Declining productivity in mining operations, which in turn affects 
the price of coal and its competitiveness with natural gas;42 
• Declining coal exports due to a reduction in Chinese demand;43 
 
 37.  See Irina Ivanova, For the First Time, the U.S. Got More Electricity from Renewables than Coal, 
CBS NEWS (June 27, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/renewable-energy-electricity-
surpasses-coal-in-us-for-the-first-time/. The overtaking of renewables appears to be occurring more quickly 
than anticipated. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Energy Outlook 2017 with Projections to 2050, at 70 
(Jan. 5, 2017), available at https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/0383(2017).pdf [hereinafter EIA 2017] 
(forecasting renewable generation exceeding coal generation annually starting only in the 2020s). 
 38.  See Lesley Fleischman et al., Ripe for Retirement: An Economic Analysis of the U.S. Coal Fleet, 
26 ELECTRICITY J. 51 (2013); Joshua Linn & Kristen McCormack, The Roles of Energy Markets and 
Environmental Regulation in Reducing Coal-Fired Plant Profits and Electricity Sector Emissions, 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 6–7 (2017), https://www.rff.org/publications/reports/the-roles-of-energy-
markets-and-environmental-regulation-in-reducing-coal-fired-plant-profits-and-electricity-sector-emissions/. 
 39.  See Fleischman et al., supra note 38; William Nelson & Sophia Liu, Half of U.S. Coal Fleet on 
Shaky Economic Footing: Coal Plant Operating Margins Nationwide, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. 
(Mar. 26, 2018) (on file with authors). 
 40.  Stefan Rehbach & Robert Samek, Downsizing the U.S. Coal Industry: Can a Slow-Motion 
Train Wreck Be Avoided?, MCKINSEY & CO. 3 (Nov. 2015), http://www.mining.com/wp-content/uploads
/2015/12/Downsizing-the-US-coal-industry.pdf. 
 41.  Houser et al., supra note 31, at 7.  
 42.  Sanya Carley et al., Adaptation, Culture, and the Energy Transition in American Coal Country, 
37 ENERGY RES. & SOC. SCI. 133 (2018). 
 43.  Houser et al., supra note 31. 
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• Unexpectedly low demand for electricity in several recent winters, 
compounded or caused by the Great Recession;44 
• Rapidly falling natural gas prices, spurred by the development of 
shale gas through hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking”;45 
• Growing consumer demand for clean energy, driving utilities to 
increase natural gas and renewable generation capacity;46 and 
• Environmental regulations that raised the cost of coal and drove 
utilities to shift generation capacity to cheaper inputs.47 
Among these various factors, existing research provides ample support for 
falling natural gas prices (due to innovation in shale gas extraction) as the 
primary factor leading to the decline in demand for coal.48 
The relationship between the coal industry’s stock prices and natural gas 
energy prices is strong, as shown in Figure 2. In a widely cited study, energy 
analysts Trevor Houser, Jason Bordoff, and Peter Marsters estimated that 
displacement by “natural gas is responsible for 48.9 percent of the decline in coal 
production nationwide, [with] renewables (including hydro and biomass) . . . 
responsible for 17.8 percent, and nuclear . . . responsible for 7.7 percent.”49 In 
another study, economists John Coglianese, Todd Gerarden, and Jim Stock found 
a strong relationship between natural gas prices and declining coal production, 
with more than 90 percent of coal production’s decline attributable to cheaper 
natural gas.50 These findings accord with more general research modeling the 
relationship between natural gas prices and coal generation.51 
Unlike prior studies, our purpose in this paper is not to test for all of the 
possible causes of the coal industry’s decline. Instead, our purpose here is to use 
market behavior to assess the plausibility of a more straightforward but widely 
 
 44.  Coglianese et al., supra note 33; Houser et al., supra note 31; Catherine Hausman & Ryan 
Kellogg, Welfare and Distributional Implications of Shale Gas 3, 31 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 21115, 2015).  
 45.  Coglianese et al., supra note 33; Houser et al., supra note 31; Hausman & Kellogg, supra 
note 44. 
 46.  Saha, supra note 33; Houser et al., supra note 31.  
 47.  Coglianese et al., supra note 33; Houser et al., supra note 31. 
 48.  Coglianese et al., supra note 33, at 56-57. 
 49.  Houser et al., supra note 31, at 19. The remaining 25.6 percent drop in demand for coal-powered 
energy derived simply from overall reductions in demand for electricity. Id.  
 50.  Coglianese et al., supra note 33. 
 51.  Christopher R. Knittel et al., Natural Gas Prices and Coal Displacement: Evidence from 
Electricity Markets 14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21627, 2015); Joseph A. 
Cullen & Erin T. Mansur, Inferring Carbon Abatement Costs in Electricity Markets: A Revealed 
Preference Approach Using the Shale Revolution, 9 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 106 (2017); Harrison Fell 
& Daniel T. Kaffine, The Fall of Coal: Joint Impacts of Fuel Prices and Renewables on Generation and 
Emissions, 10 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 90 (2018); Joshua Linn & Lucija Muehlenbachs, The 
Heterogeneous Impacts of Low Natural Gas Prices on Consumers and the Environment, 89 J. ENVTL. 
ECON. & MGMT. 1 (2018); Scott J. Holladay & Jacob LaRiviere, The Impact of Cheap Natural Gas on 
Marginal Emissions from Electricity Generation and Implications for Energy Policy, 85 J. ENVTL. ECON. 
& MGMT. 205 (2017); Reid Johnsen et al., Estimating Indirect Benefits: Fracking, Coal, and Air Pollution, 
IZA DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 10170 (2016); Linn & McCormack, supra note 38.  
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Source: EIA 
held claim that is central to “war on coal” rhetoric—namely, that environmental 
regulations had substantial negative effects on coal companies’ profitability.52 
B. The Regulatory “War on Coal” 
Political rhetoric about the regulatory “war on coal” has generally centered 
on federal environmental regulation and specifically on three EPA rules: the 
Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), the Mercury and Air Toxics Stan-
dards (MATS), and the CPP.53 Unlike other earlier environmental regulations, 
these three rules are thought to have disproportionately affected the demand for 
coal because they were explicitly designed to address pollution from old utility   
 
 52.  See Gordon, supra note 7. The claim persists to the present as analysts continue to attribute the decline 
of coal at least in part to environmental regulations imposed on electric utilities. See, e.g., Taylor Kuykendall, U.S. 
Coal Sector Remains in Rough Shape Heading into 2020s After Decade of Decline, S&P GLOBAL (Dec. 20, 2019), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/tyh7jmk_PMJ1i_C2yAOC5w2 (stating 
that “[i]nstead of a coal construction boom in the country, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency began 
enforcing new rules restricting power plant emissions of mercury, a regulatory move that contributed to 2015 
setting a high watermark for annual coal power plant retirements . . . .”). 
 53.  Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and 
Correction of SIP Approvals (Cross-State Air Pollution Rule), 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97); National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for 
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 
63) [hereinafter MATS]; Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (CPP). 
Figure 2: Coal Price and Natural Gas Price, 2000-2017 
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plants—largely coal-fired plants—that had been “grandfathered” under the 
original Clean Air Act.54 Although new coal-fired power plants have been 
subject to environmental regulations since passage of the Clean Air Act of 1970, 
the statutory grandfathering of existing coal-fired power plants meant that these 
old plants were shielded from the brunt of regulatory limitations so long as utility 
companies were able to find innovative ways to keep them operating.55 By 2012, 
over 75 percent of coal-fired power plants had been operating for over thirty 
years, and 20 percent had been operating for over fifty years.56 This “distortion 
of retirement decisions” created what some scholars have called the “old plant 
effect”—that is, the operation of power plants longer than their originally 
anticipated lifespan.57 For decades, administrations from both parties had sought 
to address this distorting, environmentally undesirable effect.58 
Although the CSAPR, MATS, and CPP rules were in some ways building 
on previous attempts to address the old plant effect,59 these three regulations are 
said to have been the most pointed efforts to bring the largely unregulated, 
existing coal plants under some kind of emissions control regime.60 Richard 
Revesz, law professor and former dean at New York University Law School, and 
his coauthor Jack Lienke note that industry’s “narrative of ‘Obama’s war on 
coal’” focused on “three major ‘fronts’ in the President’s supposed war—the 
Transport Rule [CSAPR], the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard, and the Clean 
Power Plan.”61 In fact, these three rules were part of a concerted “Climate Action 
 
 54.  REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 35–49. 
 55.  See Gordon, supra note 7; REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 35–49. 
 56.  REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 32. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  One of the previous efforts was the attempt during the George W. Bush administration to ratchet down 
New Source Review in order to make it easier to construct new coal-fired power plants. This approach to the old 
plant effect has typically been strongly supported by the coal industry and utilities. REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5. 
 60.  For example, in asserting that EPA “has declared a war on coal,” the editor of industry magazine Coal 
Age cited “[t]wo major rules [that] will affect the future of U.S. power generation: the proposed Maximum 
Achievable Control Technology Rule (the Utility MACT Rule) and the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (the 
Transport Rule).” Will the EPA Acknowledge the True Cost of Its War on Coal?, COAL AGE (Aug. 25, 2011), 
https://www.coalage.com/from-the-editor/will-the-epa-acknowledge-the-true-cost-of-its-war-on-coal/. A coal 
industry lawyer characterized the MATS rule as “a key element of an illegal and devastating war on coal.” Cody 
Nett, Assistant General Counsel for Murray Energy Corp., Public Hearing Comments on “Reconsideration of 
Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review for Coal- and Oil-Fired Utility Steam 
Generating Units” (Nov. 2017). Robert Murray, the CEO of Murray Energy Corp., declared that “[t]he CPP was 
the center piece of the Obama Administration’s ‘War on Coal.’” Robert Murray, Chairman, President and CEO, 
Murray Energy Corp., Comments on “State Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric 
Utility Generating Units” (Nov. 2017); see generally REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 1–2 (noting that “[a]s the 
primary evidence of this undeclared war [on coal], its opponents point to three regulations issued pursuant to the 
Clean Air Act that aim to reduce pollution from the nation’s aging power plants”: namely, CSAPR, MATS, and 
CPP); see also infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text. 
 61.  REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 2. As Revesz and Lienke have elsewhere explained: 
[T]he most commonly cited evidence of “war” are three EPA restrictions on pollution from 
power plants: the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, commonly known as the Transport Rule, 
which prevents plants in upwind states from exporting dangerous soot- and smog-forming 
pollution to their downwind neighbors; the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which restrict 
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Plan” (CAP) announced by President Obama in 2013, acknowledging the role of 
an aging coal-fired power plant fleet in preventing realization of carbon dioxide 
emission reduction goals.62 Together, the three rules essentially forced electric 
utilities to factor new, and potentially steep, compliance costs into their decisions 
about whether to continue relying on an aging fleet of coal-fired plants or to shift 
generation to newer plants that could use other types of fuel, such as natural gas. 
We provide additional details about each of these three key rules in Part III, 
where we analyze the stock market’s reactions to each. For now, we note that 
these three rules have received outsized blame, on both the campaign trail and in 
political debate, for the coal industry’s changing fortunes.63 Such distinctive 
attention appears to have had meaningful policy consequences because implicit 
in assigning blame to these regulations has been the assumption that weakening 
or removing them could reverse the trends that the coal industry had experienced. 
As a presidential candidate, Donald Trump promised to rescind the Obama-era 
climate regulations in an effort to augur a return to greatness for the coal 
industry.64 As president, one of his earliest actions was to direct EPA to consider 
repealing the CPP65—declaring that “[p]erhaps no single regulation threatens our 
miners, energy workers, and companies more than this crushing attack on 
American industry.”66 His EPA has since rescinded the CPP,67 and it is well 
underway toward making a substantial rollback of the MATS.68 
Despite the attention paid to climate regulation as the source of the coal 
industry’s decline, researchers who have sought to investigate the substantive 
 
plants’ emissions of mercury and other toxic pollutants; and the Clean Power Plan, which will 
limit plants’ emissions of climate change–driving carbon dioxide. 
Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, How Obama Went from Coal’s Top Cheerleader to its No. 1 Enemy, GRIST (Feb. 
15, 2016), https://grist.org/climate-energy/how-obama-went-from-coals-top-cheerleader-to-its-no-1-enemy/. 
 62.  See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT’S 
CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 10, 18 ( 2013) [hereinafter CAP]. 
 63.  NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 1, 2017, 3:06 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/01/01/507693919/coal-country-
picked-trump-now-they-want-him-to-keep-his-promises; see also supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
 64.  See, e.g., Presidential Candidate Donald Trump Indiana Primary Night Speech, C-SPAN (May 
3, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?409020-1/donald-trump-delivers-remarks-indiana-victory (stat-
ing that “[t]he miners in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, Ohio, all over, they are going to start to work 
again. You’re going to be proud to be miners”) [hereinafter Trump]; An America First Energy Plan, 
TRUMP PENCE 2016 (May 26, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20161122001345/https:/www.donald 
jtrump.com/press-releases/an-america-first-energy- plan (outlining a 100-day action plan that begins by 
rescinding climate regulations in order to “save the coal industry”). 
 65.  Exec. Order No. 13,783: Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 
16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).  
 66.  Press Release, White House, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Executive Order to 
Create Energy Independence (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-
president-trump-signing-executive-order-create-energy-independence/. 
 67.  Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 68.  National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility 
Steam Generating Units-Reconsideration of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology 
Review, 84 Fed. Reg. 2,670 (Feb. 7, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
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effects of these regulations have failed to find much support. One study estimated 
that EPA regulations may have been associated with about a 3.9 percent decline 
in domestic coal production (about 10 percent of the total decline from 2011 to 
2016) and a 5 percent decline in coal-fired generation (about 17 percent of the 
total decline in generation from 2011 to 2016).69 Another study estimated that 
environmental regulations, and primarily just the MATS rule, accounted for no 
more than about 6 percent of the decline in demand for domestic coal.70 As these 
studies indicate, existing research has focused on demand for coal and industry 
production levels. Although some have speculated about how investors might 
react to changing dynamics in the energy market and in energy regulation, the 
financial market’s assessment of the so-called regulatory “war on coal” has 
remained unexamined.71 In the next two Parts of this Article, we describe our 
empirical research to fill that gap. 
II.  INVESTIGATING THE MARKET EFFECTS OF THE “WAR ON COAL” 
Our point of departure from previous research into regulation’s effect on coal 
comes from our use of financial data—namely, the daily share prices of publicly 
traded securities issued by coal firms. The main data we use come from the U.S. 
Stock Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices. Stock prices are 
widely considered an important measure of the health and profitability of 
businesses, and we exploit this measure to analyze the impact of regulation on 
market evaluations of coal firms. We analyze these financial data using two 
approaches: event studies and difference-in-differences analyses.72 
A. Event-Study Analysis 
Event-study analysis is a common statistical strategy used to capture the 
impact of an event on a company’s stock price by estimating a normal model of 
a stock’s performance and measuring the departure from that normal model in 
the immediate wake of news of a decision or event.73 Event studies rely on a 
“semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis,” which posits that stock 
 
 69.  Houser et al., supra note 31, at 22.  
 70.  Coglianese et al., supra note 33, at 56-57. 
 71.  See Nico Bauer et al., Divestment Prevails Over the Green Paradox When Anticipating Strong 
Future Climate Policies, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 130 (2018). 
 72.  We conducted our event-study analysis using the software Eventus made available through the 
Wharton School’s research data services. This software requires the researcher to select the event date, the 
sample firms, and other parameters and then automatically extracts data from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices and computes abnormal returns and statistical significance tests. For our difference-in-
differences analysis, we worked directly with raw daily return data using the statistical analysis software Stata. 
 73.  See, e.g., Charles J. Corrado, Event Studies: A Methodology Review, 51 ACCT. & FIN. 207 
(2011); S.P. Khotari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 4 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007); A. Craig MacKinlay, Event 
Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 13 (1997); Jonah B. Gelbach et al., Valid Inference 
in Single-Firm, Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 495 (2013); Jill E. Fisch et al., The Logic 
and Limits of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 553 (2017). 
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prices are reflective of the information that is publicly available to investors and 
that these prices respond quickly to the introduction of new information to the 
market.74 Under this widely accepted assumption, any abnormal return in the 
short “event window” after the introduction of information about an intervening 
event can essentially be understood as the market’s valuation of the impact of the 
news associated with that event.75 
Event-study analysis has been used widely to interpret the impact of financial 
events, such as mergers or earnings announcements.76 The approach has also been 
used to investigate the market impact of laws and regulations imposed on 
business.77 Other studies have found that investors can react negatively to 
developments in the regulatory or legislative process. For example, events leading 
up to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley financial accounting reform legislation in 
2002 reportedly led to a one-time overall loss in stock market value as high as $1.4 
trillion, due to changes in market expectations occurring around those legislative 
events.78 When the Food and Drug Administration announced its regulation of 
cigarettes in the 1990s, the stock prices of the major tobacco companies 
experienced a statistically significant loss.79 On occasion, when regulation serves 
 
 74.  Fisch et al., supra note 73, at 19. For further discussion of efficient market theory, see Eugene 
F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); 
Eugene F. Fama, Two Pillars of Asset Pricing, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1467 (2014). 
 75.  Although stock prices respond to many factors, only one of which may be regulation, in the 
short run it is likely that any anomalous performance of the stock immediately following news of a salient 
regulatory event will in fact be a response by investors to the perceived impacts of regulation on business. 
 76.  See Paul Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 51 
(1983); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 945 (2007); John J. Binder, Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data, 
16 RAND J. ECON. 167 (1985).  
 77.  For an early discussion of the use of event studies to analyze regulation, see G. William 
Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J. L. & ECON. 121 (1981). For more 
recent research, in addition to the studies discussed in the body of this paragraph, see, e.g., Istemi Berk & 
Jannes Rauch, Regulatory Interventions in the US Oil and Gas Sector: How Do the Stock Markets Perceive 
the CFTC’s Announcements During the 2008 Financial Crisis?, 54 ENERGY ECON. 337 (2016) (finding 
significant positive returns associated with Commodity Futures Trading Commission regulatory 
interventions on oil and gas stocks at the height of the Great Recession); Brian Libgober & Daniel 
Carpenter, Lobbying with Lawyers: Financial Market Evidence for Banks’ Influence on Rulemaking 2–4 
(Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth, Working Paper, 2018) (reporting an association between market 
reactions and agency rulemaking comments in the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform 
Act of 2010). Event studies of stock returns have also been used to study the impact of enforcement actions 
and other actions taken by regulatory agencies. See, e.g., Duane B. Graddy & Thomas H. Strickland, 
Market Perceptions of EPA Actions under Different Political Regimes, 48 Q.J. FIN. & ACCT. 83 (2009) 
(event study of EPA regulatory enforcement actions); Denise M. Keele & Susan DeHart, Partners of 
USEPA Climate Leaders: An Event Study on Stock Performance, 20 BUS. STRATEGY & ENVT. 485 (2011) 
(event study of EPA voluntary program). 
 78.  Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 44 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 75 (2007); see also Howard H. Chang & David S. Evans, Has the Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 30 
REGULATION 48, 51 (Winter 2008) (“One study by Ivy Zhang estimated that the U.S. stock market lost 
$1.4 trillion in value, which is over 10 percent of annual U.S. GDP, as a result of the legislative events 
leading up to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.”). 
 79.  Jeffrey R. Lax & Mathew D. McCubbins, Courts, Congress, and Public Policy, Part I: The 
FDA, the Courts, and the Regulation of Tobacco, 15 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 163, 184 (2006). 
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to create barriers to entry for competition, event studies have shown that stock 
prices can respond positively to news of regulatory developments, as one study 
found in connection with the development of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s cotton dust standard and EPA’s prevention of significant 
deterioration rules.80 
Event-study methods have also been used to evaluate the impact of court 
decisions on stock prices. One study of over 200 Supreme Court cases showed 
statistically detectable abnormal returns for affected firms in about 37 percent of 
cases.81 Studies specifically about court decisions in regulatory cases have found 
such decisions to be associated with abnormal returns. When a district court 
upheld the Food and Drug Administration’s regulation of cigarettes, for example, 
major tobacco company stocks experienced statistically significant losses.82 In 
contrast, a study of the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s proxy access rule found that firms that would have been most 
affected by the rule lost stock value in the wake of the court’s rejection of the rule, 
implying that the market placed positive value on the regulation of proxy access.83 
For each of the three EPA rules at the center of the regulatory “war on coal” 
narrative (CSAPR, MATS, and CPP), our analysis focuses on two major regulatory 
events: the public release of the proposed rule and the public release of the final 
rule. We also analyze subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning each of 
these rules. Although prospects for the development of each regulation will likely 
have been known to the market in advance, the issuance of a proposed rule will be 
the first time that the public (including investors) will be able to see concretely 
what the agency plans to do. Similarly, although the prospect of a final rule will 
also obviously be known—because the agency has, after all, issued a proposal—
the final release brings new information to the market. Not only does it bring 
certainty, as some proposed rules never result in a final rule, but it also provides 
the market with information about exactly what that regulation will say. Not 
infrequently, a final rule will differ from a proposed rule. In addition, at the same 
time EPA releases its rule language—whether proposed or final—it also releases 
a separate regulatory “preamble” that contains additional information about each 
regulatory action, including the results of the agency’s benefit-cost analysis of the 
proposed or final rule.84 In using event-study analysis, we seek to assess the extent 
to which these key events in EPA’s rulemaking processes, and the information they 
bring to the market, affect investors’ expectations about the coal industry’s future 
 
 80.  Michael T. Maloney & Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality 
Regulation, 25 J. L. & ECON. 99, 122 (1982). 
 81.  Daniel Martin Katz et al., Law on the Market? Evaluating the Securities Market Impact of Supreme 
Court Decisions (2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2649726.  
 82.  See Lax & McCubbins, supra note 79. 
 83.  Bo Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from the 
Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J. L. & ECON. 127 (2013). 
 84.  Under the Administrative Procedure Act, agencies are to “incorporate in . . . rules adopted a 
concise general statement of their basis and purpose”—known as a preamble. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
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profitability. In light of the highly salient claims about a regulatory “war on coal” 
narrative, our expectation is that the market will respond negatively to these pivotal 
events in the development of the three “war on coal” regulations.85 
We do much the same for Supreme Court decisions related to each 
rulemaking. As we explain further below, the Supreme Court issued some 
surprising and significant decisions with respect to the “war on coal” regulations. 
In the case of CSAPR, the Supreme Court upheld EPA’s rule, while in the case 
of MATS, the Court invalidated it.86 We thus expect the market to have 
responded negatively to the news of the Court’s decision with respect to CSAPR 
but positively to the MATS decision.87 The Supreme Court never passed final 
judgment on the CPP, but it did take an even more shocking step by keeping the 
rule from taking effect pending the resolution of litigation in the lower courts.88 
Never before had the Court acted to block an agency rule in this way, making the 
occurrence of this event a complete surprise to everyone, even the lawyers 
involved.89 By staying the CPP, the Court not only bought industry more time, 
but it also signaled clearly to everyone that a majority of the Justices had legal 
concerns about EPA’s regulation. For this reason, we expect investors in the coal 
industry to have responded positively to the news of the Supreme Court’s stay. 
We forgo here a detailed account of the econometric methods involved in 
undertaking event studies, as others have provided a sufficient account of these 
established techniques.90 For present purposes, we simply highlight the essential 
steps that any event-study analysis undertakes: 
(1) identify one or more appropriate event dates; 
(2) calculate the stock’s return on each event date; 
 
 85.  As a general matter, our expectation of negative results would be strongest for the proposed 
rule event for each regulation, as this is the first time that the market has clear information about what 
EPA plans to do. Of course, especially with respect to the final rule, positive reactions from the market 
are also conceivable, such as if the final rule turns out to be less onerous to the industry than the proposed 
rule. In either case, the magnitude and the volume associated with the “war on coal” rhetoric—our main 
interest—would lead us to expect some statistically perceptible market reaction to these pivotal regulatory 
developments.  
 86.  EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 496 (2014) (upholding CSAPR as 
based on a permissible construction of the Clean Air Act’s good neighbor provision); Michigan v. EPA, 
135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (striking MATS due to EPA’s failure to consider costs when making its 
determination of whether regulation was “appropriate and necessary”). 
 87.  Although our principal analyses center on the Supreme Court decisions passing on the legality of 
both of these rulemakings, we also report in footnotes in the relevant sections below the results of event-study 
analyses of the lower court decisions and the Supreme Court’s grants of certiorari agreeing to hear an appeal. 
 88.  Bob Sussman, The Supreme Court’s Clean Power Plan Missteps, BROOKINGS (Feb. 12, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2016/02/12/the-supreme-courts-clean-power-plan-missteps/ 
(discussing the stay and noting that the “immediate effect of the stay will be to halt enforcement of the 
CPP while the courts conduct a full review of its validity under the Clean Air Act”). 
 89.  See, e.g., Andy Anderson, Unprecedented: Supreme Court Stays Clean Power Plan; Scalia’s Death 
Impact on the CPP?, ENERGYWATCH, https://energywatch-inc.com/unprecedented-supreme-court-stays-clean-
power-plan-scalias-death-impact-on-the-cpp/ (last visited May 30, 2020) (noting that “[f]or the first time in U.S. 
history, the Supreme Court stepped in to stay a regulation that was still being reviewed by a lower court”). 
 90.  See, e.g., John J. Binder, The Event-Study Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. 
& ACCT. 111 (1998); Corrado, supra note 73; Khotari & Warner, supra note 73; MacKinlay, supra note 73. 
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(3) determine the stock’s expected return for each event date by 
estimating a model of normal performance; 
(4) subtract the actual return from the expected return (based on the 
model of normal performance) to compute the excess or abnormal 
return for each event date; and 
(5) evaluate whether the resulting excess or abnormal return is 
statistically significant.91 
Figure 3 illustrates how these steps come together to yield the results we will 
report from our statistical analyses. 
The vertical axis in Figure 3 represents the coal firms’ share prices, while 
the horizontal axis represents the passage of time. At some point along the 
horizontal axis, an event occurs—for example, the Supreme Court hands down 
its decision to stay the CPP.92 We undertake first to compute the path or trend  
that average coal stock prices were taking in the period leading up to the event—
the period called the “estimation window.” We next extrapolate that trend past 
the event for an increment of time called the “event window.” We then can 
compare actual share prices at the end of the event window with where they 
would have been had the trend prior to the event continued to hold—the latter 
counterfactual estimate being called the “normal returns.”93 
 In Figure 3, we illustrate the direction that coal company stocks would be 
expected to respond in the wake of news of the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP 
if that EPA regulation had constituted part of a “war on coal.” The Court’s 
surprising decision to halt the CPP would be expected to constitute good news 
for the coal industry, lifting stock prices higher than they would have otherwise 
been expected to be based on the pre-stay trend. If statistically significant, this 
positive difference in actual share price at the end of the event window, compared 
with what the price would have been based on the preexisting trend prior to the 
stay, is called an excess or abnormal return.94 
In the example of the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP, we would expect 
a positive abnormal return, precisely as illustrated in Figure 3. Indeed, positive 
 
 91.  Fisch et al., supra note 73, at 20.  
 92.  Following the convention of those who conduct event studies, in reporting our results in the 
next Part of this Article, we denote the day of any given event day as “0.” Pre-event time is thus indicated 
in negative days and post-event days in positive days. The event day is often denoted as “(0,0),” with the 
first number indicating the beginning date of the event study and the second number indicating its ending 
date. This notation becomes useful when referring to different windows of time examined in an event 
study—or “event windows.” For instance, the event window of interest might be one day long, starting at 
the beginning of the event day, so that abnormal returns would only be estimated for the window (0,0). 
But if the researcher is interested in a longer event window—say, three days—the event window could 
run from (0,2), indicating that the event window covered the day of the event, the day after the event (day 
one) and the day after the day after the event (day two).  
 93.  Figure 3 is a simplification for illustrative purposes. In calculating both pre-event trends, post-event 
extrapolations of that trend, and the actual post-event returns, we are both averaging across all the coal companies 
in the sample and controlling for other variables, such as overall stock prices (based on the S&P average). 
 94.  These daily abnormal returns can be summed across the event window to provide a measure of 
cumulative abnormal returns, with a separate test of the statistical significance of these cumulative impacts. 
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abnormal returns would be expected to result whenever the courts act to halt or 
remand any “war on coal” regulation. On the other hand, such returns would be 
expected to be negative in the wake of events leading to the imposition of new 
regulatory burdens on coal-powered utility plants, such as announcements of the 
issuance of proposed or final rules. In other words, rather than expecting to see 
coal stock prices increase relative to the normal baseline in the wake of the new 
regulatory event, the “war on coal” narrative would imply that share prices would 
drop—resulting in negative abnormal returns—in response to events associated 
with the imposition of regulatory burdens on coal-powered utility plants. 
As long as another confounding event does not occur at the same time as 
the event of interest, the excess or abnormal return in the event window, if 
statistically significant, can be taken as the market’s short-term response to the 
information conveyed by or with the event under study. Researchers typically 
use varying estimation and event windows to assess the market reaction to events 
of interest. Following convention, we report separate statistical analyses using 
event windows of one- and three-day durations (as well as individual-day 
windows for each of the first three days). As a general rule, reactions observed 
in the smaller windows will merit greater confidence because less time has 
elapsed during which other factors or events could influence observed changes 
in stock prices. 
In addition to our main event-study analyses of each of the “war on coal” 
regulations and their associated Supreme Court decisions, we report in Part III 
the results of a variety of additional related events, including the adoption of the 
Paris Agreement and President Trump’s announcement of the U.S. withdrawal 
from the agreement. In Part IV, we also report results from a variety of additional 
event-study analyses of other events for comparison purposes. 
Figure 3: Illustration of Event-Study Methodology 
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B. Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
Although the event-study approach constitutes our principal empirical 
strategy, we also adapt a difference-in-differences technique to compare stock 
market reactions between coal firms and natural gas firms. Whereas an event-
study approach seeks to measure the impact of an event by comparing a single 
firm’s stock performance immediately after the event to its own normal 
performance as measured before the event, a difference-in-differences approach 
considers an event to be a form of what in other contexts would be called the 
treatment or intervention. Difference-in-differences analysis has frequently been 
used to study the effects of regulatory interventions.95 Here, we use this method 
of analysis to compare the post-event outcomes for one group (or panel) thought 
to be affected by the event to the post-event outcomes for another group (or 
panel) not thought to be affected.96 This allows for estimation of the difference 
between the former “treated” firms’ outcomes and those of the counterfactual 
with no “treatment.”97 
The difference-in-differences approach we use here does not compare coal 
firms that might have been affected by regulations to other coal firms that were 
thought not to be affected by regulations, since the EPA regulations at the center 
of our analysis were national in scope and presumably affected the demand for 
coal from all coal firms. Instead, we use the difference-in-differences approach 
to compare the stock prices of coal firms to the stock prices of their most serious 
competition: natural gas firms. This effectively controls for any unobserved 
variables that might equally affect both coal and gas firms. 
Difference-in-differences analysis works here much like our event-study 
analysis; however, instead of benchmarking coal firms’ post-event stock prices 
to an extrapolation of the same coal firms’ pre-event stock prices, we are using 
an extrapolation based on differences in price trends benchmarked against the 
stock performance of natural gas firms. As with our event-study analysis, we 
undertake first to compute the path or trend in stock prices before the event—but 
we make separate computations for coal firms and for natural gas firms. We also 
compute post-event price trends for each group. We used the trends in stock 
prices before and after the event in both groups to compute the predicted level 
where prices of coal stocks would have been vis-à-vis natural gas stocks absent 
the event. We then test whether the difference is statistically significant. 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Lori Snyder Bennear, Are Management-Based Regulations Effective? Evidence from 
State Pollution Prevention Programs, 26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 327, 333 (2007). 
 96.  For accessible discussions of difference-in-differences approaches, see JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & 
JÖRN-STEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S COMPANION 227–42 
(2009); Lori Snyder Bennear & Cary Coglianese, Measuring Progress: Program Evaluation of 
Environmental Policies, 47 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y SUSTAINABLE DEV. 22 (2005); Cary Coglianese, 
Measuring Regulatory Performance: Evaluating the Impact of Regulation and Regulatory Policy, OECD 
Expert Paper No. 1 (Aug. 2012), available at http://www.oecd. org/regreform/regulatory-policy/1_
coglianese%20web.pdf. 
 97.  ANGRIST & PISCHKE, supra note 96. 
2020] WHITHER THE “WAR ON COAL”? 23 
Much like with the event study, we would expect the Supreme Court’s 
decision to stay the CPP to amount to particularly good news for the coal industry 
relative to natural gas firms, so coal stocks would be expected to increase in value 
relative to the expected trend benchmarked to natural gas firms. By contrast, the 
“war on coal” narrative would imply that other events announcing regulatory 
obligations on coal-powered utilities would be expected to yield a decrease in 
coal stock prices relative to those for natural gas firms. 
We use difference-in-differences analysis here as an additional test to see 
whether stock market behavior supports the political claims that environmental 
regulations disadvantaged the coal industry. This separate analysis serves as an 
important robustness check of our event-study analysis. Our difference-in-
differences strategy might even be thought to be more likely than the event-study 
approach to find an effect on share prices following key regulatory events that 
disadvantage one sector but not the other, given that a regulatory event that 
disadvantages coal firms would be expected, by extension, to advantage natural 
gas firms that are in direct competition. 
C. Data and Sample 
With our unit of analysis being daily stock price, we focus on publicly 
traded coal firms.98 During the period under study, ten U.S. publicly traded coal 
companies existed that, taken together, constituted nearly two-thirds of the total 
coal market. Table 1, drawn from a ranking of major U.S. coal producers in the 
Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Coal Report 2016, shows 
available data for U.S. market share in coal production for the publicly traded 
companies in our sample (bolded) along with other major private coal producers. 
In 2016, our sample firms comprised 63.2 percent of the total U.S. coal 
production. Within the sample, however, there was wide variation in market 
share. Peabody was the dominant player in the industry, with Arch and Cloud 
Peak typically having vied for second place. A number of our sample firms 
clustered together in a second tier ranging from 1.7 percent to 5.0 percent of 
production. As a general matter, it appears that publicly traded firms had greater 
market share than private firms. Only Murray Energy, Contura Energy, and, to 
some extent, Vistra Energy were major competitors to the bulk of the publicly 
traded firms in our sample. Overall, Table 1 reveals a long tail on the low end of 
the distribution—with many firms in the coal mining industry that had an 
extremely small slice of the pie (and with most of these small firms being 
privately owned and operated). Focusing on the ten publicly traded firms, as we 
do, captures the bulk of production and hence the bulk of exposure to any 
competitive effects from regulation. One important note about our sample: For  
  
 
 98.  Privately owned coal companies, such as Murray Energy and Contura Energy, are obviously 
not included in our analysis. 
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Table 1: Top Producing Coal Mining Firms as of 201699 
 
 
some events in our analysis, data for some firms were unavailable. As discussed 
above, the event-study methodology extrapolates a “normal” trend through an 
event window based on stock price data from before the event. In our case, we 
use an estimation window of 250 days. If a firm did not have publicly traded 
stocks on the market for any reason during that period (for instance, because of 
a bankruptcy at that firm or because that firm’s stock offering had not yet 
occurred), then the firm is not included in that particular analysis. Thus, in some 
of our results, the industry-wide estimates are based on a subset of our sample 
of ten publicly traded firms. Arch, in particular, was sometimes absent in our 
results because it was in bankruptcy proceedings during a critical stretch of 
time overlapping with our events and estimation windows. Likewise, when we 
estimate single-firm event studies below, we omit analyses when there were no 
usable data for the particular firm-event combination. Any missing estimate is 
not due to a choice on our part, but rather due to the fact that the firms in our 
 
 99.   U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Annual Coal Report 2016 16 (Nov. 2017). 
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sample sometimes were in and out of the category of publicly traded firms due 
to factors outside our control (namely, bankruptcy), making analysis of stock 
prices impossible for those firms at particular times. 
III.  STOCK MARKET REACTIONS AND THE REGULATORY “WAR ON COAL” 
As previously mentioned, our main analysis focuses on the three 
environmental regulations most often singled out in the “war on coal” narrative: 
CSAPR, MATS, and CPP. We also analyze other, more general policies 
designed to address climate change as well as direct environmental effects of 
coal mining operations. But we begin with the three principal environmental 
regulations that have figured centrally in the narrative of a regulatory “war on 
coal.” Taking each in turn, we apply event-study and difference-in-differences 
methods to critical events in each regulation’s development, promulgation, and 
post-promulgation histories. 
A. The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) 
CSAPR is EPA’s latest attempt under the authority of the Clean Air Act’s 
so-called good neighbor provision to deal with the wafting of sulfur dioxide and 
nitrogen oxides across state lines. Sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides can “react 
in the atmosphere and contribute to the formation of fine particle (soot) 
pollution” and to “ground-level ozone (smog) formation.”100 For decades, 
utilities in the Rust Belt built increasingly taller smokestacks that dispersed these 
pollutants into the atmosphere where they drifted into northeastern states and 
caused soot and smog to formulate, preventing these downwind states from 
coming into compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards.101 The 
CSAPR project began in 2008 after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia vacated a George W. Bush-era effort to deal with this same problem, 
thereby sending EPA to work on a replacement.102 The resulting rule—
CSAPR—provided for an emissions trading program with allowances distributed 
to states according to the degree to which they were capable of reducing 
emissions that were traveling across state lines.103 The rule was proposed on July 
 
 100.  EPA, Overview of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), https://www.epa.gov/csapr/
overview-cross-state-air-pollution-rule-csapr (last visited May 30, 2020). Sometimes this rule has been 
referred to as the Air Transport Rule or even just the Transport Rule. See REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 
5. 
 101.  See Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A 
Response to the Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535 (1997); REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5, at 85–86. 
 102.  North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See Brian H. Potts, The Court Kills 
EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule—But Which States Really Won?, 25 ELECTRICITY J. 36 (2012).  
 103.  See Erin Carson & Eric Davis, Final Impacts of Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Vary by Industry 
and Region, ENERGY SOLUTIONS F. (May 27, 2014), https://enerknol.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05
/ESF_PnU_EPA-CSAPR_ 5.27.14.pdf; Potts, supra note 102. 
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6, 2010104 and finalized exactly one year later on July 6, 2011.105 The announce-
ments of the proposed rule and the final rule marked the first time the full detailed 
regulatory language had been released, along with additional information about 
how the agency understands and interprets the regulatory language. 
As not infrequently happens with major EPA rules,106 the finalized CSAPR 
was challenged in federal court by a coalition of utilities and upwind states. In 
2012, the D.C. Circuit vacated CSAPR, citing concerns about the methods used 
to determine state allowances and the bypassing of the normal state 
implementation planning process.107 However, on appeal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed that decision, holding in EPA v. EME Homer Generation that 
EPA’s approach to a “thorny causation problem” was a reasonable exercise of 
its authority under the Clean Air Act by considering states’ ability to pay for 
emissions reductions in addition to their “physically proportionate 
responsibility.”108 With the victory in the Supreme Court, EPA was poised to 
move forward with the first substantial regulation of the interstate pollution 
created by existing coal-fired power plants. 
Did stock prices in the coal industry decline in the wake of the Court’s 
decision or the release of the new information associated with any of the 
regulatory events leading up to that decision? Table 2 presents the results of our 
event-study analysis of several of the key developments.109 The minus signs in 
parentheses in the left-most column indicate the direction that we expected 
share prices to take if they followed the “war on coal” narrative: negative here 
because the narrative views CSAPR as harmful to the coal industry, and each 
event either moved this regulation forward toward taking legal effect or sustained 
it on judicial review. 
The results in Table 2 fail to show CSAPR events as having any meaningful 
effect on coal share prices—certainly nothing as might have been expected, given 
 
 104.  See Federal Implementation Plans to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and 
Ozone, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,210 (Aug. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97). The date 
of publication in the Federal Register always follows the date that a proposed or final rule is signed and 
announced publicly. We use the latter date for our event analysis, as the earlier date is when the stock 
market received the news and copy of the agency’s decision. 
 105.  See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone 
and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 
72, 78, 97). The publishing of the final rule was delayed one month but was signed on July 6. 
 106.  Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory 
Process, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 735 (1996). 
 107.  EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  
 108.  EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 514 (2014).  
 109.  In the upper row, the numbers in parentheses separated by commas under each column heading 
refer to the range of days included in each event window. With “0” representing the day of the event, a 
range of zero to zero (that is, “0,0”) represents the abnormal return on the day of the event, whereas “1,1” 
represents the abnormal return on the day after the event and “0,2” represents a cumulative abnormal 
return of the day of the event and the two days following the event. As also noted in Table 2, we report 
two-tailed tests for statistical significance. We do this for all of the event-study analyses in this Article. 
Separately, we performed each analysis using a one-tailed test as well. Although not reported here, the 
results were substantially the same. 
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the “war on coal” rhetoric. The direction of the market response to the proposed 
CSAPR rule signing was opposite of that expected on day one; although it was 
consistent on the second day, neither of the results were statistically significant. 
The release of the final rule saw a day-one change in the direction expected under 
a “war on coal”—but it was not statistically significant either. Furthermore, the 
final rule was followed by a statistically significant and positive day-two response, 
precisely the opposite of expectations. The Supreme Court’s decision was also 
followed by a statistically significant abnormal positive return on day one. 
 Our difference-in-differences analysis also failed to produce results 
consistent with expectations. As noted above, our difference-in-differences 
approach tests for any divergence between natural gas companies’ share prices and 
coal companies’ share prices in the wake of each event, rather than just coal stocks’ 
prices compared with those same companies’ pre-event prices. Here, the key 
variable in Table 3 is “DiD,” which is an interaction of the dependent variable (the 
average difference in daily returns) between two dummy variables: one for whether 
the observation occurred after the event, the other for whether the firm was in the 
coal industry versus the natural gas industry. Simply put, a positive coefficient 
would mean that the stock price changes in the coal industry were comparatively 
more positive than similar changes in the natural gas industry. Yet none of the 
coefficients meet the normal test of statistical significance, and the signs on the 
coefficients for half of the models run in the opposite direction of that implied by 
the rhetoric of a regulatory “war on coal.” The only nearly statistically significant 
result for the difference-in-differences estimator was a 1.81 percent 
outperformance of coal compared to natural gas on the day after the Supreme 
Court’s decision—which is precisely the opposite of what the “war on coal” 
rhetoric would imply.110 
 
 110.  By “marginally” significant, we simply mean that it is significant at the 10 percent level rather 
than at the standard 5 percent level of significance, even though we also report significance at the 10 
percent level when it occurs. In adhering to the 5 percent level as the test of significance, we follow the 
Table 2: Event-Study Results for the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
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 Overall, our results for CSAPR are hard to square with expectations of a 
resounding “war on coal.” For most of the event windows, we fail to find any 
basis for rejecting our null hypotheses. For the two event windows with 
statistically significant results, the direction of the effect is opposite what we 
expected. Interestingly, the Supreme Court’s approval of EPA’s first real foray 
into uncharted territory—the regulation of existing coal-fired power plants—not 
only did not appear to lead investors to value coal stocks less, but it seemed to 
lead them to value them more. Moreover, none of the results from the difference-
in-differences analysis are significant; if anything, they might suggest that the 
Supreme Court’s decision resulted in more of a negative effect on natural gas 
stock prices than on such prices for coal. Commentators have suggested that 
industry had been revising its expected compliance costs downward with CSAPR 
over the course of the litigation,111 so perhaps the absence of expected market 
responses to the Supreme Court’s decision simply indicates an increasing 
recognition of the limited impact of this regulation on the future profitability of 
coal mining firms.112 
 
customary approach in social science research. See generally Richard Lempert, The Significance of 
Statistical Significance, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 225 (2009) (discussing statistical significance). 
 111.  See Carson & Davis, supra note 103. 
 112.  We also checked two other litigation-related events using event-study analysis, which yielded 
mixed results. First, even though we would have expected the vacatur of the rule by the D.C. Circuit to be 
a positive development for coal companies, the abnormal returns were negative and statistically 
significant, with a loss of 2.88 percent across the three-day event window. We also checked the Supreme 
Court’s grant of the petition for certiorari—an event that we expected would be negative for the coal 
Table 3: Difference-in-Differences Results  
for the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
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B. Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) 
Few observers dispute the economic significance of EPA’s regulation of 
mercury emissions from coal-powered utility plants. When Congress revisited 
the Clean Air Act in 1990, it greatly bolstered EPA’s authority to regulate 
“hazardous air pollutants” (HAPs).113 Unlike with so-called criteria pollutants, 
for which regulations generally only apply to new sources, standards for HAPs 
can be applied to existing sources through technology-based emissions control 
requirements.114 EPA has used this authority approximately ninety times since 
1990.115 With MATS, it took direct aim at existing coal-fired power plants, 
which emit mercury and certain heavy metals at a higher rate than combined-
cycle natural gas plants. When EPA issued the final MATS rule on December 
21, 2011,116 the agency estimated annual compliance costs would amount to $9.6 
billion (with $37 to $90 billion in benefits to the public).117 With this kind of 
money at stake, it is little surprise that industry challenged MATS, just as it did 
CSAPR. Initially, the challengers did not prevail at the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals; however, on June 29, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Michigan v. 
EPA that the agency had acted unlawfully by failing to consider compliance costs 
as part of a threshold inquiry into whether the regulation was “appropriate and 
necessary” under the Clean Air Act.118 The regulatory “war on coal” narrative 
would imply that the Supreme Court’s decision should have had a positive effect 
on coal companies’ share prices, as it sent the rule back to EPA and limited 
EPA’s ability to impose a future costly regulation on the industry. 
The evidence, though, is not closely aligned with the expectations generated 
by the “war on coal” narrative. The event-study results in Table 4 show that in 
the days after each event (rule promulgation, finalization, and litigation), coal 
stocks swung in both directions, sometimes in unexpected ways. For instance, 
the stock market’s reaction following the proposed rule’s unveiling was actually 
quite positive in the day-one window—contrary to expectations. But then it was 
nonexistent in the day-two window and only statistically significant and 
consistent with expectations on the third day. When it came to the signing of the   
 
industry, given the decision of the lower court to vacate the rule—and these results were consistent with 
expectations, with a loss of 5.22 percent across the three-day event window. This is the only result for 
CSAPR consistent with expectations. 
 113.  Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 301–306, 104 Stat. 2399, 2531–
2584 (1990). 
 114.  42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2018). 
 115.  Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic 
Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 119 (2011). 
 116.  EPA, EPA Announces Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) for Power Plants Rules and 
Fact Sheets (Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.epa.gov/mats/epa-announces-mercury-and-air-toxics-standards
-mats-power-plants-rules-and-fact-sheets. 
 117.  See MATS, supra note 53, at 9,304, 9,306. This is the same rule as was finalized in December 
2011, but the publication of the final rule lagged by a little more than a month after the actual signing of 
the final rule, as noted in the immediately preceding footnote. 
 118.  See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015). 
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final rule, the market results were positive but not statistically significant. As 
with the proposed rule, only on the third day after the final rule appeared were 
results significant and consistent with expectations. And when it came to the 
Supreme Court’s surprising decision in Michigan v. EPA, although the market 
reaction did appear to deliver an expected boost to the coal market in the day-
one results, the gains were more than offset by significant negative abnormal 
returns over the next two days, leaving a three-day cumulative result that was 
negative but nonsignificant.119 
Taken together, the results from the three events are difficult to interpret in 
a way that would lend much support to the “war on coal” narrative. The initial 
market response to the proposed rule produced some statistically significant 
abnormal returns in the first day—but in the direction opposite of what the “war 
on coal” narrative would lead one to expect. Only the day-three results were 
significant in the direction expected, as was the case with the final rule. Yet for 
the Supreme Court’s decision rejecting the final rule, it was the initial, day-one 
reaction that was consistent with expectations, while the second and third days 
showed significant reactions opposite of expectations. For all three events, if one 
looks at the market reaction across the entire three-day period, in no instance are 
the results significant and consistent with expectations. In fact, only for the 
proposed rule does the three-day window show a statistically significant result—
and that is in the direction opposite of expectations. 
 
 119.  As with CSAPR, we also checked two other litigation-related events for MATS: the lower court 
decision, and the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. With the D.C. Circuit decision to uphold the 
rule, we expected to find negative returns. Although the sign was uniformly negative in every window we 
checked, none of the results registered as statistically significant. We also checked the Supreme Court’s 
grant of the petition for certiorari, which we expected would lead to positive abnormal returns for the coal 
firms, given the industry loss below and the likelihood that a grant of certiorari would lead to a reversal. 
In fact, though, the results suggest that the market perceived the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari as a 
negative event for the coal industry. The day-one returns were down 2.39 percent (statistically significant 
at the .001 level) and the cumulative three-day returns were down 4.12 percent (also statistically 
significant at the .001 level). 
Table 4: Event-Study Results for the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
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Our difference-in-differences analysis yielded only one statistically 
significant result. As shown in Table 5, neither the proposed nor the final rules 
seemed to yield any diverging price reactions between the coal and natural gas 
industries. Both rule promulgation events seemed to be generally positive for the 
natural gas and coal stocks together, as suggested by the generally statistically 
significant and positive results on the post-event variable and the lack of 
statistically significant results for the difference variable. With respect to the 
Supreme Court decision, the difference-in-differences analysis appears consistent 
with the results from the event study, in that the immediate impact of the Supreme 
Court’s decision appears to have been associated with a sharp divergence between 
coal and natural gas in the expected direction, but this effect was short lived, as the 
three-day results show no difference in the performance of natural gas and coal 
returns. 
 Some complicating factors in interpreting the results for the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA should be noted—even though it is not 
entirely clear which way they cut. One factor is that, by the time the Supreme 
Court handed down its decision, many utilities apparently had already complied 
with the rule, and many of the anticipated coal-powered utility plant retirements 
had already taken place.120 Perhaps that is why the initial positive reaction to the 
 
 120.  See Gavin Bade, What the Supreme Court MATS Ruling Means for Utilities and the EPA Clean 
Power Plan, UTILITY DIVE (July 2, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-the-supreme-court-
mats-ruling-means-for-utilities-and-the-epa-clean-po/401707/; Susan E. Dudley, Supreme Court to EPA: 
Fool Me Once, FORBES (Feb. 10, 2016, 8:37 AM), https: //www.forbes.com/sites/susandudley/2016/02/10
/supreme-court-to-epa-fool-me-once/; EIA Annual Outlook 2012, supra note 31. Although the event-study 
analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision might not have reflected the negative effects on the firms because 
they already incurred the costs, this would obviously not have been the case at the time the proposed and 
final rules were announced—and we find that the earlier of the significant reactions to the proposed and 
final rules ran in the direction opposite of expectations. 
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Results for the Mercury and Air Toxics 
Standards 
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Supreme Court’s decision dissipated quickly, as market actors realized that even 
the Court’s decision would not have spared the coal industry any diminution in 
demand for coal from utilities. But another factor may also be important: The 
Supreme Court specifically declined to vacate the rule, instead remanding the 
case to the D.C. Circuit and allowing that lower court to make a decision about 
whether EPA needed to start from scratch with cost considerations in mind.121 
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit left EPA’s rule in place and did not halt any 
compliance deadlines, and the Supreme Court declined to review this subsequent 
decision by the lower court.122 As a result, what initially looked like a legal 
victory for the coal industry when the Supreme Court handed down its decision 
in Michigan v. EPA—and which we have assumed it to be in outlining 
expectations in our analysis above—in fact never turned out to be any real victory 
at all. 
C. The Clean Power Plan (CPP) 
Although MATS and CSAPR made important strides in regulating the 
emissions of conventional pollutants from existing coal-fired power plants, from 
the standpoint of climate change they did not address the elephant in the room: 
carbon emissions from burning coal. As of 2016, coal-fired power plants emitted 
about 68 percent of the total carbon dioxide from the electric power sector, or 
about 1241 million metric tons.123 In adopting the CPP, EPA for the first time 
set direct carbon dioxide emissions guidelines for existing power plants and set 
up a process of state planning to come into compliance with these guidelines.124 
Altogether, the CPP was projected to lower carbon dioxide emissions by 32 
percent below 2005 levels by 2030 and deliver net public benefits between $26 
and $45 billion.125 Yet due to unprecedented action by the Supreme Court, the 
CPP never took effect. 
The CPP was challenged in court by industry and several states on the same 
day it was made final, and the challengers, as is relatively common, sought a 
judicial stay of the rule’s legal effect pending litigation.126 The D.C. Circuit 
denied the challengers’ motion for a stay, a decision which the challengers 
 
 121.  Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2712. 
 122.  See Brady Dennis, Supreme Court Rejects Case Challenging Key White House Air Pollution 
Regulation, WASH. POST (June 13, 2016, 5:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-enviro
nment/wp/2016/06/13/supreme-court-rejects-case-challenging-key-white-house-air-pollution-regulation/. 
 123.  See EIA 2018, supra note 9. 
 124.  See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,662–63 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 125.  EPA, Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan Benefits of a Cleaner, More Efficient Power Sector, 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-benefits-cleaner-more-efficient-
power-sector.html (last visited May 30, 2020). 
 126.  See, e.g., State Petitioners’ Motion for Stay and for Expedited Consideration of Petition for 
Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 16-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015), available at https://www.edf.org
/sites/default/files/content/2015.10.23_states_motion_for_stay_expedited_consideration.pdf. 
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appealed to the Supreme Court (also not uncommon).127 But what was entirely 
uncommon was the Court’s subsequent decision to grant the stay when the lower 
court had denied such a request. The Supreme Court had never done this 
before—ever.128 When the Court granted the challengers’ request, it not only 
handed down one of the most surprising decisions in the history of regulatory 
challenges, it also effectively added years to the timeline for regulating carbon 
dioxide emissions, giving a major and clear victory to utilities and the coal 
mining industry. It also signaled that a majority of the Supreme Court did not 
hold a favorable view of EPA’s regulation and that the agency was unlikely to 
prevail when the merits of the challenge would eventually reach the Court.129 In 
the so-called regulatory war, the coal industry secured a seemingly pivotal and 
unprecedented battlefield victory. 
Yet the CPP’s effects on the coal industry would almost seem to have been 
something of an afterthought for investors. The unveiling of the proposed CPP 
was associated with no significant differences in either the event-study analysis 
(Table 6) or the difference-in-differences analysis (Table 7). And even though  
the final rule’s signing corresponded with significant negative abnormal returns 
over the following two days, we cannot be at all assured that these differences in 
returns were associated with the CPP. The same day that EPA Administrator 
Gina McCarthy signed the CPP, one of the largest coal players—Alpha Natural 
Resources—filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after posting losses of $875 million 
in 2014.130 We discuss bankruptcies and how they affected returns in greater  
 
 127.  Application by 29 States and State Agencies for Immediate Stay of Final Agency Action During 
Pendency of Petitions for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S.Ct. 1000 (2016) (No. 15A773). 
 128.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Coral Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to 
Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics
/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html (stating that “[t]he 5-to-4 vote [to 
grant the stay], with the court’s four liberal members dissenting, was unprecedented—the Supreme Court 
had never before granted a request to halt a regulation before review by a federal appeals court”); Lisa 
Heinzerling, The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 425 (2016) 
(noting that “[i]n staying EPA’s Clean Power Plan, the Supreme Court for the first time stopped a 
nationally applicable agency regulation prior to an initial decision on the merits of the rule in a lower 
court”); see also EPA: PROPOSAL: AFFORDABLE CLEAN ENERGY (ACE) RULE, https://www.epa.gov
/stationary-sources-air-pollution/proposal-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule (last visited June 1, 2020).  
 129.  See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue et al., Supreme Court Blocks Obama Climate Change Rules, CNN 
(Feb. 10, 2016, 8:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/09/politics/supreme-court-obama-epa-climate-
change (quoting Bruce Huber as saying that “[t]he Supreme Court’s order signals serious misgivings 
among some of the justices about the legality of the plan”); Lawrence Hurley & Valerie Volcovici, U.S. 
Supreme Court Blocks Obama’s Clean Power Plan, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2016, 6:31 PM) (noting that “[t]he 
Supreme Court’s action casts doubt on the long-term future of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s rule because it increases the chances that the conservative-leaning Supreme Court would take 
the case after a lower court issues a decision on the legality of the regulations and ultimately would strike 
it down”). 
 130.  Compare Nathan Vardi, U.S. Coal Company Alpha Natural Resources Files for Bankruptcy, 
FORBES (Aug. 3, 2015, 10:36 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/2015/08/03/u-s-coal-
company-alpha-natural-resources-files-for-bankruptcy, with Press Release, Gina McCarthy, EPA 
Administrator, Six Things Every American Should Know About the Clean Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), 
https://blog.epa.gov/2015/08/03/6-things-clean-power-plan/; 80 Fed. Reg. 64941 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
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detail in Section IV, but for now we simply note that there is much stronger 
evidence that bankruptcies in the industry affect coal companies’ share prices 
more than regulations do. It seems highly plausible that the market reactions on 
August 3, 2015 and August 4, 2015 are attributable to the Alpha Natural 
Resources’ bankruptcy. 
This reading is strengthened by the lack of positive returns for coal firms in 
the wake of the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP just months later, in February 
2016. In this highly surprising decision to stay the CPP pending further litigation, 
five Justices prevented the rule from taking legal effect, handing the coal industry 
Table 6: Event-Study Results for the Clean Power Plan 
Table 7: Difference-In-Differences Results for the Clean Power Plan 
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 a huge break.131 Although litigation surrounding important federal regulations 
is not uncommon,132 the Court’s decision to stay the CPP was widely considered 
“stunning”133 because apparently never before had the Supreme Court stayed a 
regulation that had yet to be reviewed by a federal appeals court.134 Even lawyers 
for the entities challenging the CPP were reportedly surprised to have the Court 
grant their petition.135 The decision to stay the rule in such circumstances almost 
certainly indicated that, when the Supreme Court would inevitably hear an appeal 
of the lower court litigation, it would either uphold an appellate court’s decision 
to strike the rule down or would reverse an appellate decision upholding the rule. 
Given this surprising turn of events, one might expect the Supreme Court’s 
stay decision to have had an immediate effect on the market capitalization of 
publicly traded coal firms, boosting the fortunes of a beleaguered industry engaged 
in a supposedly existential fight with regulators. From the standpoint of event-
study methodology, the Supreme Court’s decision to grant a stay of the CPP in 
2016 stands as a true exemplar of exactly the kind of surprising and clear event 
that should provide a strong test of what market actors’ think in its immediate 
aftermath. Yet investors’ reactions did not match expectations. Figure 4 displays 
the daily share price returns at closing (percentage change from the previous 
trading day) around the Supreme Court’s decision for the stocks of the seven 
publicly traded coal mining firms in operation at the time. Because the Supreme 
Court’s decision on February 9 came after the end of trading hours, the vertical 
dashed line at February 10 marks the end of the first day that investors could react 
to the news. Contrary to expectations, none of the firms reacted strongly that day. 
Only one firm—Peabody Energy Corporation (dashed line)—responded on 
February 11, and that firm’s returns were severely negative, wholly opposite of 
what the regulatory “war on coal” narrative would imply. 
The event studies in Table 6 show that, for the first two days after the decision, 
coal stocks lost ground (although these results were not significant). It was only on 
the third day that stocks rebounded, leaving the industry with a three-day 
cumulative return that was normal by statistical standards (albeit still negative).136 
Given the relative simplicity of the ruling—an unprecedented stay of the rule— 
 
 131.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Puts the Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 9, 2016, 7:36 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09
/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/. 
 132.  See Coglianese, supra note 106; see generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2009) (arguing that American policy processes tend to be adversarial and litigation prone). 
 133.  Liptak & Davenport, supra note 128(quoting Jody Freeman).  
 134.  See id. 
 135.  As one news report explained: “The stay order was unexpected. Jeff Holmstead, an industry 
attorney at Bracewell whose clients are challenging the regulation, called the high court’s move 
‘remarkable.’ It’s ‘the first time that the Supreme Court has ever stepped in at this stage to put a rule on 
hold,’ he said.” Amanda Reilly & Robin Bravender, Is Obama’s Signature Climate Rule Doomed?, E&E 
DAILY (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060032134.  
 136.  As indicated in Table 6, we use February 10 as the event date for our analysis. We do so because 
the Court’s ruling came out after markets had closed on February 9. Nothing of consequence hinges on 
this choice, as the same analysis using February 9 as the event date produces no clearer effects. 
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Figure 4: Daily Coal Stock Returns Surrounding the Supreme Court’s  
2016 Stay of the Clean Power Plan 
 
and the lack of a market response on the first two days of trading immediately 
following the ruling, we do not believe that the day-three positive result could have 
had much to do with the decision. We also note that, in this case, the first day of 
analysis was actually the first day after the Court’s decision, which was announced 
after trading hours on February 9, 2016. The market had time by the first day in 
our analysis to understand the Court’s ruling and factor that into stock prices—but, 
based on the empirical results, it appears the ruling made no difference to 
investors.137 
If one were to surmise that the CPP’s finalization had a negative effect on 
coal stocks (independent of the Alpha Natural Resources bankruptcy that occurred 
on the same day), then one presumably would expect that the stay of the rule by 
the Supreme Court would have been a positive event. Yet in neither the event study 
nor the difference-in-differences analysis did coal stocks do as well after the 
Supreme Court’s stay as they did before, nor as well as natural gas share prices did 
in response to the stay. Indeed, we even looked at intraday trading to see if stocks 
were down in the minutes after the market opened on February 10, 2016, before 
any other negative news could contaminate the effect of the previous night’s stay. 
Even in the short-run, coal stocks were steeply down.138 
Of all the events we analyzed, the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP is the 
clearest one to test the extent of the effect of environmental regulations on the 
 
 137.  For much the same reason, three-day window results effectively become four-day window 
results, another reason why we are skeptical of attributing the reaction at that point to the Court’s decision.  
 138.  We were unable to locate any data on after-hours trading that could be used to investigate any 
effects prior to the opening minutes of February 10, 2016. 
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market’s assessment of the coal industry’s profitability. The CPP has played a 
central—if not the central—role in the narrative of the regulatory “war on 
coal.”139  
Moreover, the Court’s stay of the rule was, by all accounts, a shocking 
development that won great praise within the coal industry.140 And yet, coal 
stocks never responded in a way consistent with expectations. If anything, stock 
prices declined further in the immediate response to the stay. Our results here 
would seem to draw into serious question the notion that environmental 
regulation was perceived as a serious threat to the coal industry’s financial 
viability. That is not to say that the industry’s viability was strong, just to say 
that investors in the industry—those with a real stake in understanding the 
relationship between regulation and the industry’s financial prospects—did not 
apparently see the CPP as making any meaningful additional difference, all 
things considered. 
D. Other Climate Policies 
As noted, the CPP was the centerpiece of the Obama administration’s 
climate policy. Along with CSAPR and MATS, it has figured prominently in 
accounts of the federal government’s regulatory approach toward climate change 
and the coal industry.141 Yet the CPP was just one part of a larger “Climate 
Action Plan” (CAP) announced in 2013, which articulated a range of policy 
actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—not just by reducing emissions 
from electric utilities but also by promoting greater fuel economy in 
transportation and energy efficiency in buildings and appliances.142 
Furthermore, at the same time that U.S. regulators were busy developing their 
domestic regulatory responses to climate change, world leaders were pursuing 
international negotiations over a global agreement with potential ramifications 
for coal. In December 2015, the international community reached agreement on 
the Paris Agreement, under which countries made commitments to reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions—albeit commitments that were not in any fashion 
 
 139.  On the campaign trail, Donald Trump claimed that the CPP “will shut down most, if not all, coal-
powered electricity plants in America.” Tessa Berenson, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Jobs and the 
Economy, TIME (Sept. 15, 2016), https://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript/. As 
president, Trump has said of the Clean Power Plan: “Perhaps no single regulation threatens our miners, energy 
workers, and companies more than this crushing attack on American industry.” Remarks by President Trump 
at Signing of Executive Order to Create Energy Independence, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-create-
energy-independence/. 
 140.  See Andrew M. Harris, The Last King of Coal Makes His Stand as Mines Vanish Around Him, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 28, 2015, 9:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-28/the-last-
king-of-coal-makes-his-stand-as-mines-vanish-around-him. 
 141.  See, e.g., REVESZ & LIENKE, supra note 5.  
 142.  See supra note 62; see generally Meredith Fowlie et al., An Economic Perspective on the EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan, 346 SCI. 815, 816 (2014) (providing an overview of the economics of the CPP). 
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binding or enforceable under international law.143 The Paris Agreement signaled 
a more aggressive policy posture toward the threat of global climate change, 
which in turn was predicted to lead to a mass “divestment effect” in long-term 
investment in coal.144 The United States committed under the Paris Agreement 
to making a substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2025: 26-28 
percent below 2005 levels. Of course, within his first year in office, President 
Trump delivered what would seem to have been a major win for the coal industry 
by announcing his intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris 
Agreement—an announcement preceded by a palpable level of “suspense” 
leading up to its actual delivery.145 
Table 8 reports the results of an event-study analysis of the CAP 
announcement, the signing of the Paris Agreement, and President Trump’s 
announcement that the United States would be withdrawing from the Paris 
Agreement. The results for the CAP and the announcement of the signing of 
the Paris Agreement are more indicative of the expected market reaction to 
climate policies’ effects on the coal industry than were the domestic 
regulations typically associated with the regulatory “war on coal.” Both the 
CAP and the Paris Agreement showed statistically significant and negative 
effects on coal firms in either the day-one or day-two windows—strong enough 
that they also appear as statistically significant negative effects in the cumulative 
three-day window. The announcement of the United States withdrawal from the  
 
 
 143.  See Cary Coglianese, Pledging, Populism, and the Paris Agreement: The Paradox of a 
Management-Based Approach to Global Governance, 34 MD. J. INT’L L. 139, 141 (2019); THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 666 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017); 
Sophie Yeo, Top Questions and Answers Now That the U.S. Has Decided to Leave the Paris Climate 
Accord, WASH. POST (June 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp
/2017/06/01/the-world-built-a-climate-deal-for-the-u-s-trump-may-be-about-to-leave-it/. 
 144.  See Bauer et al., supra note 71. 
 145.  On the suspense leading up to the announcement, see, e.g., Trump Announcing Decision on 
Paris Climate Deal, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 31, 2017), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news
/trump-expected-pull-us-paris-climate-deal-1008919 (“Building suspense about America’s role in the 
world . . . Trump himself said Wednesday [the day before the announcement] that he was still listening to 
‘a lot of people both ways’”). On the announcement itself, see, e.g., Yeo, supra note 143. 
Table 8: Event-Study Results for Other Climate Change Policies 
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Paris Agreement, though, did not appear to lead to any concomitant gains for 
coal. The abnormal returns across the window were, contrary to expectations, 
consistently negative, albeit not statistically significant. 
 At the same time that the event-study results suggest that some of the global 
or broader commitments to addressing climate change might have had some 
negative effects on stock prices for the coal industry, the difference-in-
differences results reported in Table 9 appear to suggest that these effects may 
have applied more generally to the nonrenewable energy sector. Only in the day-
one estimation for the Paris Agreement signing is there any evidence of a 
diversion between natural gas and coal firms, and even that result is not 
statistically significant at the conventional level. This lack of a divergence is 
striking, given that, at the time of these developments, natural gas was still seen as 
a key, if not even favored, energy source.146 In the CAP, for example, the White 
House noted that “[b]urning natural gas is about one-half as carbon-intensive as 
coal, which can make it a critical ‘bridge fuel’ for many countries as the world 
transitions to even cleaner sources of energy.”147 The plan made clear that the 
administration preferred natural gas. In its discussion of what was then EPA’s 
proposed CPP, the White House said that the proposal “reflects and reinforces 
the ongoing trend towards cleaner technologies, with natural gas increasing its 
share of electricity generation in recent years.”148 The plan also outlined a series 
of explicit steps the administration planned to take to support natural gas develop-  
 
 146.  EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE ALL-OF-THE-ABOVE ENERGY 
STRATEGY AS A PATH TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC GROWTH 4 (May 2014) (noting that the Obama 
administration “embraces natural gas as a transitional fuel”). 
 147.  See CAP, supra note 62, at 19.  
 148.  Id. at 6. 
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ment, noting that “[g]oing forward, we will promote fuel-switching from coal to 
gas for electricity production and encourage the development of a global market 
for gas.”149 Yet judging from the analysis shown in Table 9, it appears that the 
market either did not believe the administration’s stated support of natural gas 
over coal, or it did not view these policy differences as financially meaningful. 
IV.  ASSESSING ROBUSTNESS: MARKET RESPONSES AND OTHER EVENTS 
The lack of any strong and consistent reactions of the stock market to the 
key regulatory events in the supposed “war on coal” would appear to come as a 
surprise, given the pervasive claims that environmental regulation has been a key 
factor in burning out the coal business. In stark contrast with the kinds of claims 
made by industry leaders and politicians, as reported at the outset of this paper, 
we find no clear evidence that the financial market took regulatory developments 
to be a substantial threat to coal companies’ future profitability. 
During the time period of our study—the period of the so-called regulatory 
“war on coal”—other economic factors impinged on the coal industry, especially 
growing competition from the natural gas sector.150 Perhaps one might imagine 
that these larger, long-term forces effectively drowned out any impact that 
climate change regulation may have had on the financial market performance of 
coal companies. That may be so, but the event-study methodology we have 
employed should not be affected by these longer-term trends. By focusing on 
extremely short windows of time, the event-study methodology factors out the 
secular trends that could otherwise threaten to confound longitudinal analysis. If 
there were in fact major economic effects on the coal industry from new 
environmental regulations (or their halting in the courts), and if investors were 
attentive to the financial effects of these regulatory events (as they clearly have 
an incentive to be), then their trading decisions in a short window of time after 
important regulatory events should show consistently negative abnormal returns. 
But they do not. Despite a modest effect here and there, our overall analysis 
indicates that the stock market really did not care much about the regulations that 
industry actors and politicians bemoaned so vocally. 
The results of our analysis of the effects of environmental regulation are all 
the more striking in light of other analyses we conducted that show what the 
stock market did care about with respect to coal firms in the time period we 
 
 149.  Id. at 19. 
 150.  See, e.g., Kolstad, supra note 26 (noting that “[i]n the first decade of the new millennium, 
productivity gains — this time in natural gas — generated a fundamental shift in which coal was no longer 
clearly the cheapest fossil fuel”); Houser et al., supra note 31 (indicating that “[a] surge in US natural gas 
production due to the shale revolution has driven down prices and made coal increasingly uncompetitive 
in US electricity markets”); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Fuel Competition in Power Generation and 
Elasticities of Substitution 3 (June 2012), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/fuelelasticities/pdf/eia-
fuelelasticities.pdf (noting that, “[b]eginning in 2005, natural gas production from domestic shale gas 
formations began to rapidly increase, which has led to a relatively sustained period of low natural gas 
prices”). 
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studied. As a means of testing the robustness of our event-study methodology in 
this context, we studied other, nonregulatory events that might have affected the 
stock prices of coal companies, including elections and bankruptcies. We also 
looked at other, non-climate-related regulatory events and, separately, conducted 
firm-level analyses of the same climate change regulations examined in Part III. 
Together, these robustness checks reveal that the failure to find stock market 
reactions to events in the supposed regulatory “war on coal” is no artifact of our 
event-study methodology. That same methodology has not only been used by 
others to show stock market reactions outside the environmental policy context, 
as we noted in Subpart II.A, but it also finds that coal stocks sometimes 
responded significantly to other events during the same time period as the 
regulatory “war on coal”—most especially bankruptcies in the industry. The 
juxtaposition of the findings we report in this Part with the findings in Part III 
underscores how the stock market reveals the emptiness of the political rhetoric 
about a regulatory “war on coal.” 
A. Coal Industry Bankruptcies 
Previous research indicates that bankruptcies affect share prices for other 
firms in the same industry.151 A bankruptcy declaration can sometimes be 
destabilizing, but other times it can be a boon to surviving competitors, perhaps 
because they see an opportunity to gain market share or to buy up liquidated 
assets. Toward the end of the Obama administration, a number of coal companies 
filed for bankruptcy, including some of the biggest players such as Peabody, 
Arch, and Alpha Natural Resources. It is reinforcing of the efficacy of our event-
study methodology that stock prices for competitor firms do react to bankruptcies 
by other firms in the coal industry. In fact, as Table 10 shows, the share prices 
 
 151.  See, e.g., Rama K. Jayanti & S. V. Jayanti, Effect of Airline Bankruptcies: An Event Study, 25 
J. SERVS. MARKETING 399 (2011); Gaiyan Zhang, Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is It Good 
News or Bad News for Industry Competitors?, 39 FIN. MGMT. 1719 (2010); Stephen P. Ferris et al., The 
Response of Competitors to Announcements of Bankruptcy: An Empirical Examination of Contagion and 
Competitive Effects, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 367 (1997). 
Table 10: Event-Study Results for Coal Firm Bankruptcies 
42 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 47:1 
for surviving coal firms indeed tended to react quite strongly to certain 
bankruptcy events. Three out of the five bankruptcies we analyzed—Arch, Alpha 
Natural Resources, and Walter—elicited statistically significant abnormal 
returns on day one. All of these responses were negative, as would be expected, 
and the negative direction persisted across all event windows. The magnitude of 
the abnormal returns was notable, with cumulative abnormal returns across all  
event windows showing a drop of about 8-10 percent. (Sufficient data were only 
available to permit us to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis of the 
Peabody and Arch bankruptcies, but the results in those cases were consistent 
with the event-study results in Table 10.) 
The key takeaway from these findings for present purposes lies simply in 
their contrast with the general absence of a market response to the regulatory 
events central to the “war on coal” narrative. These results indicate that our 
findings for regulation were not the product of a methodology that is somehow 
inherently insensitive to changes in the market for coal stocks. They also reveal 
what kind of market reaction was strikingly missing in the wake of the regulatory 
events analyzed in Part III. If the regulations imposed on the utility sector 
actually had amounted to a “war on coal,” then it is surprising that investors did 
not react in a manner consistent with these regulatory events being viewed as 
harbingers of bankruptcy, as the narrative would imply. 
B. Presidential Elections 
Numerous event studies in the broader social science literature have found 
that significant changes to corporations’ share prices occur in the aftermath of 
national elections.152 In much the same spirit as those other studies, we analyzed 
coal firms’ fortunes after each of the previous three presidential elections. As 
Figure 5 shows graphically, coal industry stock returns responded in the wake of 
each presidential election day. 
After the 2008 national election, coal stocks began a nose-dive: Coal firms 
saw a -11.64 percent deviation from normal returns in the three days after the 
election (Table 11). Although the graphic depiction in Figure 5 suggests a similar 
decline after the 2012 election, the three-day cumulative average abnormal return 
that year was actually statistically insignificant, as shown in Table 11. By 
contrast, coal stocks jumped upwards in the immediate aftermath of President 
Trump’s election in 2016. The day after the election, November 9, 2016, (which 
was the first time any trading could have incorporated information about 
Trump’s victory), coal stocks exhibited a highly statistically significant 9.22 
percent abnormal return and a three-day gain of 9.99 percent (Table 11). Perhaps  
 
 152.  See, e.g., Steven J. Davis, Text-Based Insights into Stock Market Behavior, Presentation at the 
University of California, Berkeley (Apr. 24, 2018), http://faculty. chicagobooth.edu/steven.davis/pdf//
Text-Based%20Insights%20Into%20Equity%20Market%20Behavior%20Berkeley%20April%202018
%20shorter%20version.pdf; Pedro Santa-Clara & Rossen Valkanov, The Presidential Puzzle: Political 
Cycles and the Stock Market, 58 J. FIN. 1841 (2003). 
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even more notably, the difference-in-differences estimators in Table 12 show 
that the coal industry performed significantly worse after the Obama elections 
and better after the Trump election in both the one-day and three-day windows 
in the aftermath of these elections. 
 The most important thing to note about these results is that they are much 
more robust than any of the findings from Part III. The only remotely comparable 
event-study finding from Part III was that for the final rule signing for the CPP—
which, recall, occurred on the same day as a major bankruptcy in the industry—
and even then, the difference-in-differences analysis did not suggest that there 
was any divergence between coal and natural gas in the aftermath of the event. 
With elections, all of the signs indicate a major effect. Of course, this should not 
be surprising. Prior to the 2008 election, candidate Barack Obama noted publicly 
that, under his preferred approach to climate policy, “If somebody wants to build 
a coal-powered plant, they can; it’s just that it will bankrupt them because they’re  
Figure 5: Cumulative Returns Surrounding Three Presidential Elections 
Table 11: Event-Study Results for Presidential Elections 
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going to be charged a huge sum for all that greenhouse gas that’s being 
emitted.”153 The rapid decline in coal production, particularly in the Appalachian 
region, that followed Obama’s inauguration certainly could give the impression 
immediately after his reelection in 2012 that things would not be looking up for 
the coal industry.154 In the 2016 election, not only did candidate Trump position 
himself as a potential savior to the coal industry,155 he was running against an 
opponent, Hillary Clinton, who had in the campaign predicted that “[w]e’re 
going to put a lot of coal miners and coal companies out of business.”156 With 
statements such as these, the future business climate for the coal industry could 
be reasonably assumed to be better under Trump and worse under Obama and 
Clinton. 
One question that might be asked is whether these elections were just a 
proxy for perceived future changes to the regulatory environment for coal. Of 
course, if that were the case, it would be all the more striking that the regulatory 
events themselves that preceded the 2016 election never yielded clear changes to 
the price of coal stocks consistent with the direction of these electoral effects. 
The market’s nonresponsiveness to the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP would 
 
 153.  Andy Barr, McCain Hits Obama on Coal Comment, POLITICO (Nov. 3, 2008, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2008/11/mccain-hits-obama-on-coal-comment-015221. 
 154.  Cicala, supra note 23 (describing it as an “easy sell”—but a misleading one—to blame Obama 
for the decline in coal after he took office). 
 155.  See Trump, supra note 64. 
 156.  Lauren Carroll, In Context: Hillary Clinton’s Comments About Coal Jobs, POLITIFACT (May 
10, 2016), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/may/10/context-hillary-clintons-comments
-about-coal-jobs/. Clinton later stated that this was the campaign statement of hers that she regretted most. 
See HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, WHAT HAPPENED 263 (2017) (stating that “it is the [comment] I regret 
most”). 
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be particularly surprising, as that could not have been predicted by the market at 
the time of any election. It seems more plausible that elections simply reflect a 
general gestalt reaction of optimism or pessimism, rather than a consideration of 
specific policies. To the extent that the election response does reflect some 
specific forecast about policy, it may be that, instead of seeing elections as a 
proxy for regulatory policy, investors saw potential implications for tax benefits, 
subsidies, and other policies that would more directly and immediately affect 
coal firms’ bottom lines. The coal industry, after all, has long enjoyed substantial 
tax advantages, pension guarantees, leases to federal lands, and other financial 
benefits from the government which might be either threatened or expanded 
depending on who occupies the White House.157 
Under President Trump, expectations that his administration would favor 
the coal industry with such direct financial benefits seem to have been borne 
out.158 His Department of Energy took the unusual step to propose that the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) offer additional subsidies to the 
coal industry.159 Although FERC has not yet approved subsidized rate proposals, 
the overall supportive posture for coal subsidies under President Trump—not to 
mention at times even active lobbying by one of his senior political advisors—
helped provide fertile ground for subsidies and tax breaks that have been granted 
 
 157.  See, e.g., Carl Pope, The Secret Coal Bail-out: Bigger Than GM, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 
2017, 12:05 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-secret-coal-bail-out_b_9577878 (arguing that 
federal policies on pensions, reclamation liability, and bonding amount to an estimated government 
“bailout” of the coal industry that is twice as large as the financial package given to General Motors in the 
wake of the 2007 financial crisis); David Roberts, Friendly Policies Keep U.S. Oil and Coal Afloat Far 
More Than We Thought, VOX (July 26, 2018, 7:54 PM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment
/2017/10/6/16428458/us-energy-coal-oil-subsidies (describing an estimated $14.7 billion of federal 
subsidies given to coal companies every year). As an indication of the kind of advantages that coal industry 
leaders contemplated the Trump administration delivering, consider that in 2017 the CEOs of both Murray 
Energy and Peabody Energy, respectively the largest privately held and publicly traded coal companies, 
reportedly called for the administration to invoke a provision in federal law that would impose a two-year 
ban on the closure of any coal-powered electricity generating plant. Jeff Horwitz et al., A Coal Country 
Dispute Over an Alleged Trump Promise Unmet, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://apnews.
com/bac7510776874d6f88c255e73de00e6c/A-coal-country-dispute-over-an-alleged-Trump-promise-
unmet. 
 158.  For discussion of the range of recent policies and proposals aimed at helping the coal industry 
that go well beyond repealing “war on coal” regulations, see Howard Gruenspecht, The U.S. Coal Sector: 
Recent and Continuing Challenges, BROOKINGS 6–10 (Jan. 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/H.Gruenspecht_U.S.-Coal-Sector_Final_Jan_20191.pdf (noting that, beyond 
regulatory change, coal-friendly policies proposed in recent years have included pricing “decisions by 
federal and state electricity regulators,” “options to mandate coal plant use,” and “[s]ubsidies for coal 
production or use”). 
 159.  Secretary Perry Urges FERC to Take Swift Action to Address Threats to Grid Resiliency, 
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.energy.gov/articles/secretary-perry-urges-
ferc-take-swift-action-address-threats-grid-resiliency; Tom DiChristopher, Energy Department 
Proposes Change to Electricity Pricing That Could Boost Coal, Nuclear Plants, CNBC (Sept. 29, 
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/29/energy-dept-proposes-power-pricing-that-may-boost-
coal-nuclear-plants.html. For commentary on the legality of this proposal, see Dan Farber, A 
Trumped-Up Bailout Plan, LEGALPLANET (June 7, 2018), https://legal-planet.org/2018/06/07/a-
trumped-up-bailout-plan/.  
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at the state level.160 His Department of the Interior also lifted the Obama 
administration’s moratorium on federal coal leases and approved new coal 
mining projects on federal lands.161 The financial impacts that these kinds of 
actions deliver are likely to be much more direct, tangible, and immediate to the 
coal industry than any that might have derived from changes to air pollution 
regulations on the electric utility industry, with their indirect, and perhaps at best 
marginal, effects on the demand for coal. 
C. Direct Regulation of Coal Mining 
One way to assess whether markets respond differently to policies with 
direct financial effects on the coal industry is to look for effects from a different 
kind of regulation. After all, the major environmental regulations we studied in 
Part III—CSAPR, MATS, and CPP—share a common feature: They only 
indirectly affected coal production rather than directly regulated coal extraction 
operations. Each of these “war on coal” rules targeted air pollution from 
electricity generation by utility companies, some of which use coal as their 
energy source. They increased utilities’ costs for using coal as an energy source 
and, as such, could be expected to decrease demand for coal and increase demand 
for natural gas—which is much less carbon intensive than coal. The fact that 
utilities have been closing their coal-fired plants and avoiding building new ones 
has lent surface-level plausibility to the regulatory “war on coal” narrative, even 
if, as we have seen, the stock-market evidence is not consistent with such a 
narrative.162 Thus, it is not surprising that complaints about the “war on coal” 
most commonly centered on these three air pollution regulations that primarily 
affected the end users of coal in the utility sector.163 Indeed, the earliest 
 
 160.  See, e.g., Gavin Bade, Ohio Advances Coal, Nuclear Subsidies After Pressure from Trump 
Campaign Official, POLITICO (May 29, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/29/ohio-coal-
nuclear-trump-1347274; Associated Press & Anthony Izaguirre, Gov. Justice Signs Tax Break for Power 
Company Amid Debt Claim, W. VA. PUB. BROADCASTING (July 31, 2019), https://www.wvpublic.org/post
/gov-justice-signs-tax-break-power-company-amid-debt-claim; Steven Allen Adams, Gov. Justice Signs, 
Vetoes Legislation by Deadline, PARKERSBURG NEWS & SENTINEL (Mar. 28, 2019), 
http://www.newsandsentinel.com/news/local-news/2019/03/gov-justice-signs-vetoes-legislation-by-
deadline/; David Roberts, The U.S. Coal Industry Is Going Out, Not With A Whimper, But With A Burst 
of Rent-Seeking, VOX (Aug. 26, 2017, 8:11 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017
/8/25/16201218/us-coal-industry-handouts. Although FERC initially rejected the Department of Energy 
subsidy proposal, it continues to pursue subsidies and other electricity policies that would financially aid 
the industry. Gavin Bade, How McConnell’s Coal Guy is Helping Trump Remake Federal Energy Policy, 
POLITICO (Aug. 5, 2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/05/neil-chatterjee-
mcconnell-coal-federal-energy-policy-1634304; David Roberts, The Trump Administration Just Snuck 
Through Its Most Devious Coal Subsidy Yet, VOX (Dec. 23, 2019, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/
energy-and-environment/2019/12/23/21031112/trump-coal-ferc-energy-subsidy-mopr. 
 161.  The War on Coal is Over: Interior Announces Historic Coal Projects in Utah, U.S. DEP’T OF 
INTERIOR (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/war-coal-over-interior-announces-historic-
coal-projects-utah (announces approval of two new coal mining projects and two extended mining leases 
on federal lands). 
 162.  See supra Part III. 
 163.  See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
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references to a “war on coal” appearing on Google Trends emerged in response 
to the proposed Waxman-Markey climate cap-and-trade bill in 2009 because of 
its expected effect on the use of coal by electricity utilities.164 But in the wake of 
the failure to pass that proposed climate legislation, the supposed “war” became 
synonymous with efforts within the Obama administration’s EPA—namely, the 
CSAPR, MATS, and CPP regulations.165 Industry has frequently cited these 
rules as the driving force behind a decreased demand for coal166—even though 
we can find no systematic evidence that investors took these claims seriously. 
But the lack of any systematic market evidence for utility-sector 
environmental regulation’s indirect effects on the coal industry does not 
necessarily mean that coal stock prices did not respond to other types of 
regulation. Specifically, it does not address whether later regulation of 
extraction-level operations—rules that post-dated the fervor over EPA’s air 
pollution rules—might have had a real impact on coal firms’ bottom lines.167 To 
test for the possibility that share prices might have responded differently to 
 
 164.  Google Trends, https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=%22war%20
on%20coal%22 (last visited June 2, 2020).  
 165.  See Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, How Obama Went From Coal’s Top Cheerleader to its 
No. 1 Enemy, GRIST (Feb. 15, 2016), https://grist.org/climate-energy/how-obama-went-from-coals-top-
cheerleader-to-its-no-1-enemy/ (reporting that, “with the failed cap-and-trade bill a distant political 
memory, the most commonly cited evidence of ‘war’ are three EPA restrictions on pollution from power 
plants: the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, commonly known as the Transport Rule, which prevents plants 
in upwind states from exporting dangerous soot- and smog-forming pollution to their downwind 
neighbors; the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, which restrict plants’ emissions of mercury and other 
toxic pollutants; and the Clean Power Plan, which will limit plants’ emissions of climate change–driving 
carbon dioxide.”); Cicala, supra note 23 (“Mining output from this region has fallen by nearly one third 
since inauguration. This drop has coincided with new regulations that have raised the cost of operating 
coal-fired power plants going forward, such as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard, the Cross State Air 
Pollution Rule, and the Clean Power Plan. Indeed, many on the political left are as eager to take credit for 
these reductions as those on the right are to assign blame. The result is a belief that these developments 
are due to actions taken in Washington DC, and therefore can be undone if only a politician favorable to 
eastern coal were in office.”); Gordon, supra note 7 (placing blame for the “war on coal” on the MATS, 
CSAPR, and CPP regulations). 
 166.  See, e.g., Reid Frazier, Federal Air Rules Force Coal Plants to Clean Up or Shut Down, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 15, 2015, 1:57 PM), https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2015/09/15/federal-air-
rules-force-coal-plants-to-clean-up-or-shut-down/ (highlighting the cited concerns of the Homer 
Generation Facility in Pennsylvania). Typical is a coal industry comment submitted to EPA that referred 
to the “first war on coal [as having been] largely fought through battles over sulfur dioxide and acid gas 
emission regulations through the New Source Review program and the [MATS] rule,” and that any 
“second war on coal” in a future administration would also be fought under the Clean Air Act. Martin T. 
Booher et al., Baker & Hostetler LLP, Counsel for the National Bituminous Coal Group, Comments on 
“Affordable Clean Energy Rule Proposal” (Nov. 2018); see also supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
 167.  In particular, the Obama administration’s signature regulation of coal mining operations was 
not even proposed until July 2015, about a month before the finalization of the CPP—the last of the three 
“war on coal” regulations. See Stream Protection Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 44,436 (July 27, 2015) (to be codified 
at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, 827). This rule was 
finalized just weeks before President Trump’s inauguration. See Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 
93,066 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 
800, 816, 817, 824, 827). We further discuss the stream protection rule infra at notes 167–68. As should 
be evident from its timing, the stream protection rule never held a central place in the overall “war on 
coal” narrative. 
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regulations that directly applied to the extraction of coal, we separately analyzed 
potential stock market reactions from several other environmental regulatory 
actions adopted during the Obama administration—specifically, those that 
directly regulated coal mining operations. 
One such Obama-era rule sought to strengthen protection from the 
environmental harms associated with a type of coal extraction method known as 
mountaintop mining removal. This increasingly prevalent method involves coal 
companies using explosives to crumble the tops of Appalachian Mountains and 
then removing the “spoil” to reveal the coal underneath.168 The Surface Mining 
Control and Reclamation Act gives the Secretary of the Interior the authority to 
regulate mining activity, and the Clean Water Act gives EPA the authority to 
regulate the disposal of the spoil material, which is often dumped in nearby 
streams and valleys and can cause serious environmental harms.169 In 2009, EPA 
and the Army Corps of Engineers developed an interagency plan (IAP) for 
“enhanced coordination procedures” that in effect made it more difficult for coal 
companies to obtain permits to dump spoil.170 This plan was challenged and 
eventually struck down in a district court.171 Then, in 2010, EPA issued 
controversial interim guidance aiming to “force the industry to adopt a practice 
of minimal or zero filling of valleys with mountain debris.”172 This policy, too, 
was challenged and struck down by a district court.173 Then, in 2014, a court of 
appeals reversed the district court decisions and reinstated both policies, in part 
on the basis that they were too informal to be reviewable as final agency 
action.174 
Meanwhile, in 2015, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and 
Enforcement (OSMRE) in the U.S. Department of the Interior began a more 
formalized, notice-and-comment rulemaking effort that resulted in what came to 
be known as the “stream protection rule.”175 This rule, published in 2016 at the 
 
 168.  See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21421, MOUNTAINTOP MINING: 
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 169.  Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1261, 1265 (1996); Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (2012) (creating the CWA Section 402 and Section 404 permit programs). 
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 170.  U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Dep’t of the Interior, and EPA Mem. of Understanding Implementing 
the Interagency Action Plan on Appalachian Surface Coal Mining (June 11, 2009). 
 171.  Nat’l. Mining Ass’n. v. Jackson, 816 F. Supp. 2d 37, 49 (D.D.C. 2011).  
 172.  See Guidance on Improving EPA Review of Appalachian Surface Coal Mining Operations 
under the Clean Water Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and the Environmental Justice Executive 
Order, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,500, 18,500–01 (Apr. 12, 2010); COPELAND, supra note 168 at 12. 
 173.  See Nat’l. Mining Ass’n. v. Jackson, 856 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 174.  See Nat’l. Mining Ass’n. v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 175.  Stream Protection Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 
700, 701, 773, 774, 777, 779, 780, 783, 784, 785, 800, 816, 817, 824, 827); see generally Brad Plumer, 
Why Trump Just Killed a Rule Restricting Coal Companies from Dumping Waste in Streams, VOX (Feb. 
16, 2017, 5:05 PM), https://www.vox.com/2017/2/2/14488448/stream-protection-rule. Although different 
than the typical troika of rules associated with the “war on coal” narrative, the stream protection rule has 
also sometimes been characterized by politicians as part of the “war on coal.” See W.Va. Officials React 
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tail end of the Obama administration, required coal mining firms to ensure that 
their new mines would not disrupt the “hydrological balance” of nearby streams 
and rivers.176 The rule never went into effect, however. After the administrative 
transition, the new Republican Congress in 2017 issued a resolution of 
disapproval under the Congressional Review Act (CRA), which vacated the rule 
and barred any similar rule in the future.177 
Table 13 reports the difference-in-differences estimators for coal versus 
natural gas in the aftermath of relevant events in the development of mountaintop 
mining regulations, both by EPA and OSMRE.178 (Event-study results are 
similar, but simply for economy of presentation, we report here the results from 
our difference-in-differences analysis.) Whereas significant results were hard to 
find with respect to regulations that indirectly affected coal mining—such as 
CSAPR, MATS, and CPP, as well as the CAP and the Paris Agreement—there 
is somewhat greater evidence that investors reacted to developments in the direct 
regulation of the coal industry. For each event listed in Table 13, we have 
indicated in parentheses the expected direction of the sign of the variable, 
depending on whether the event supported more stringent direct regulation of the 
coal industry (negative sign) or rejected or repealed such regulation (positive 
sign). 
 These more direct regulatory efforts were associated with some statistically 
significant effects on coal firms’ stock value in seven out of the nine events, with   
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Regulation of Coal Mining Operations 
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five events showing a statistically significant result within the one-day window. The 
district court’s decision striking down the 2010 guidance shows the clearest 
association: statistically significant returns in the expected direction in every 
event window analyzed. Moreover, the signs on the returns in each analysis 
yielding statistical significance all run in the direction expected if investors 
consider additional regulation to be bad for business. The introduction and 
signing of the CRA resolution of disapproval were immediately viewed as 
positive events by the stock market. 
One possible exception worth noting is the court of appeals’ reversal of the 
district court’s decision striking down the 2010 guidance. That decision is 
associated with a statistically significant positive result, even though it reinstated 
both the IAP and the guidance. At first blush, this sign seems counterintuitive, 
given that (1) the imposition of the guidance in the first place resulted in returns 
with a consistently negative sign (and significantly negative at five days out), 
and (2) the vacating of the guidance was positive and statistically significant at 
each of the event windows. Yet perhaps this positive sign should not be so 
surprising. As policy analyst Claudia Copeland argues, even as it reinstated the 
IAP and the guidance, the appeals court clarified that neither of these policy 
statements were formally binding, thus effectively giving at least a partial win to 
coal companies.179 From industry’s vantage point, the effect of the ruling was to 
reinstate the policies but essentially make compliance with them optional. This 
understanding fits the positive returns associated with the court of appeals event. 
Our analysis of mountaintop mining regulations reveals both that regulation 
can be associated with perceptible effects on stock prices and that our statistical 
methods do work to ferret out such associations. That has been our principal 
reason for conducting these analyses of a different set of regulations. As to why 
we find evidence that these direct forms of regulation of coal mining seem 
associated with stock price changes in the manner expected, when no such clear, 
significant statistical associations exist for the major but indirect regulations that 
were the principal focus of industry’s ire and politicians’ rhetoric about a “war 
on coal,” we can only speculate here. Perhaps the economic consequences of 
direct regulation of coal mining operations were more readily capable of 
estimation or more certain for investors to take into account. Or perhaps other, 
more significant factors affect the demand for coal by utility plants, making the 
increased regulatory costs to utilities largely superfluous. Many coal-powered 
plants were already well past their retirement age and, with the advent of cheaper 
energy from the hydraulic fracturing of natural gas, investors may have known 
that demand for coal in the medium-to-long term was already in decline 
irrespective of any indirect regulations, such as reflected in CSAPR, MATS, and 
CPP. Or perhaps utility companies could be expected to raise their rates or 
otherwise absorb any cost increases without much spillover effect on the demand 
for coal. Whatever the reason, the key for our purposes here—namely, 
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investigating claims of a “war on coal”—is to see that the primary regulations 
underlying those claims did not result in anything close to the same kinds of 
effects on coal stock prices that direct regulations, bankruptcies, or election 
returns did. 
D. Market Responses by Individual Firms 
As a final robustness test of our event-study analysis of the “war on coal” 
regulations’ market effects, we disaggregated our event analyses of the CSAPR, 
MATS, and CPP for the individual firms in our sample. Despite the ten firms in 
our study being “coal companies,” they do each have fairly different business 
models and profiles. Some of the firms, such as Alliance Resources Partners and 
Cloud Peak, are “thermal coal focused miners,” meaning they mostly produce 
coal that will be used for electricity generation, while others, such as Peabody 
and Arch, are more diversified.180 In particular, Peabody and Arch have 
substantial metallurgical and coking coal production, which typically is used in 
industrial processes, such as steel manufacturing.181 Likewise, there is 
substantial variation in the location of these companies’ mines. Eastern coal from 
the Appalachian region is higher in overall sulfur content, and early Clean Air 
Act regulations made this fact irrelevant by requiring scrubbers on all smoke 
stacks.182 However, despite the protection of eastern coal afforded by 
environmental regulation, production of lower sulfur content coal in the Powder 
River Basin in Wyoming—much of it by Peabody Energy Company—has caught 
up in recent years, possibly destabilizing Appalachian production and the 
companies that primarily mine there, such as Alpha Natural Resources and 
Consol Energy.183 This variation across firms only underscores the complexity 
of this industry, and presumably the heterogeneity of these firms should itself 
provide reason for skepticism about the “war on coal” narrative, insofar as it 
claims that environmental regulations have a one-size-fits-all effect on coal 
firms. 
To begin our firm-level analysis, we focus on how stock prices for 
individual firms responded to bankruptcy declarations in the industry. As Table 
14 shows, bankruptcies in the coal mining sector have led to palpable investor 
responses for some of the surviving firms. As we explained earlier, the missing   
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estimates in Table 14 are due to bankruptcies, both at the firm whose bankruptcy 
is the event in question (for example, there would be no Peabody data for the 
Peabody bankruptcy) and previous bankruptcies (for example, Arch’s 
bankruptcy overlapped with Peabody’s declaration of bankruptcy). The results 
in Table 14 suggest that bankruptcies in the coal industry matter to investors in 
a way that regulation of coal-powered electric utilities does not. In the wake of 
the Peabody bankruptcy, one company experienced positive abnormal returns. 
However, the stock for this company and three others suffered statistically 
significant negative effects following the Arch bankruptcy, and three other 
companies saw a statistically significant drop in share prices following the 
Walter bankruptcy filing. It is worth noting, moreover, the sheer magnitude of 
the abnormal returns for these events and comparing them to the magnitude of 
even the relatively few statistically significant results from the analysis of 
regulatory events. Judging from the magnitude of the returns shown in Tables 10 
and 14, bankruptcies appear to be much more important to investors than any 
other type of event. 
 Applying this same firm-level approach to environmental regulatory 
events, we report results in Table 15 for the three-day cumulative responses by 
individual firms. Surprisingly, few statistically significant changes in share 
prices are observed. Putting the finalization of the CPP to the side for a moment 
(as the Alpha bankruptcy occurred on that same day), only eight out of sixty-four 
other results are statistically significant. Of these, only two have a sign in a 
direction consistent with expectations that would follow from the regulatory 
“war on coal” narrative. 
Table 14: Three-Day Cumulative Average  
Abnormal Returns for Select Coal Bankruptcies 
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Notably, several coal firms—Cloud Peak, Westmoreland, and Consol—
did see double digit abnormal declines around the finalization of the CPP. 
Hallador also saw a statistically significant decline. It might seem, then, that 
the CPP—but by and large not either of the other two regulations—could have 
negatively affected just a small handful of publicly traded firms. At the most, 
then, these firm-level results might suggest that any negative effects of the “war 
on coal” regulations on firms in the coal sector were heterogeneous, with some 
firms affected to some degree even though the industry saw no systemic effect 
overall. In this sense, the effects of climate regulation on the coal industry may 
be little different than the effects of regulation more generally.184 Still, even this 
finding of heterogeneous effects across different firms would be itself 
noteworthy because it contrasts with the fervent political rhetoric claiming an 
industry-wide regulatory “war on coal”—not on some individual coal firms. 
Rather than any systemic assault, a few air pollution regulations imposed on the 
utility sector may have, at most, affected the stock prices of only a few individual 
coal firms. 
 But in fact, even such a limited conclusion cannot be drawn because the 
coal industry saw one of its largest bankruptcies (Alpha Natural Resources) occur 
on the same day that the CPP was signed. Moreover, no statistically significant 
abnormal returns for any company are observed in connection with the proposed 
CPP rule. We thus cannot say with any confidence that any of the effects in Table 
15 for the four firms showing statistically significant, negative abnormal returns 
can be attributed to the signing of the CPP rather than the Alpha bankruptcy. 
Based on the market reactions to bankruptcies as reported above, the overall 
effect—in its size, direction, and number of firms—looks more consistent with a 
reaction to the Alpha bankruptcy than to the CPP. This conclusion is only 
reinforced by the firm-level share reactions to the unprecedented Supreme Court 
stay of the CPP, as the only two firms with statistically significant changes in 
their share prices saw those prices decrease—not increase as one would have 
expected based on the “war on coal” rhetoric. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
In the previous Parts of this Article, we report the findings from our efforts 
to look carefully, through a variety of empirical lenses, for what investors 
thought about the key regulatory developments that figured prominently in the 
narrative of a “war on coal” from new regulations on existing coal-power utility 
plants. Yet we could not find any clear, systematic indication that investors 
thought much at all of the main regulatory characters in the “war on coal” story: 
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CSAPR, MATS, and CPP.185 It is true, of course, that the coal industry as a 
whole experienced a substantial secular decline in production levels over the last 
decade, along with a loss of jobs, numerous facility closings, and several 
bankruptcies. But the results presented in this paper are consistent with the view 
that this decline has stemmed mostly—if not entirely—from secular causes, such 
as the rise of less expensive natural gas (and, increasingly, sources of renewable 
energy), rather than acute regulatory events.186 We find no evidence that would 
allow us to conclude that key Obama-era environmental regulations targeting 
coal-fired electricity generation led to changes in the investment in the coal 
industry consistent with the “war on coal” narrative. At the same time, the same 
measures and methods of analysis did reveal significant responses in coal 
company stock prices from other events, such as bankruptcies and elections, 
suggesting that the lack of consistent responses to the “war on coal” regulations 
is not merely an artifact of our data or empirical methods. 
In this final Part, we recap our principal findings, putting them into further 
context and drawing out their implications for regulatory law and policy more 
generally. The lack of any consistent, systematic evidence that would allow us 
to dismiss the null hypothesis for the events pivotal to the regulations targeted 
by the “war on coal’s” proponents is certainly striking. After all, under standard 
economic theory, forcing utility companies to internalize their negative 
externalities from burning coal should increase the private costs of using coal 
and lead utilities to look to alternative sources of energy. The stock market 
should thus respond negatively to news of events leading to new regulations and 
positively to those events blocking or reversing those regulations. These same 
expectations also follow from the repeated political rhetoric alleging a regulatory 
“war on coal.” Yet news of the key events in the development of “war on coal” 
regulations, as well as their subsequent litigation, shows at best only fleeting and 
inconsistent associations with coal stock prices. As we explain in this final Part, 
the absence of evidence sufficient to support the expectations that follow from 
the “war on coal” narrative may prove less surprising when one takes a step back 
and considers the results of our analyses in light of other research on the coal 
industry specifically and regulation more generally.187 We take our research 
findings to support a cautionary lesson about basing regulatory policy decisions 
on complaints about the costs of regulation put forward by self-interested actors 
who have reason to look for scapegoats or set themselves up as regulatory reform 
saviors. 
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A. Situating the Stock Market’s Nonresponse to the “War on Coal” 
As explained in Part II of this Article, we have relied on standard empirical 
methods in our effort to isolate the reactions of stock market investors to key 
regulatory events that we thought may have affected coal companies’ financial 
performance. If the dire predictions underlying the narrative of the regulatory “war 
on coal” had merit, then it is surprising not to see investors in coal companies 
responding in clear, perceptible ways to the announcement of key battles in this 
regulatory “war.” The event-study technique we have principally relied on here has 
been widely used by other researchers to find market reactions to new 
developments, including government regulations.188 It works to identify how the 
market processes new information that comes forward publicly, as occurs with the 
release of the text of a proposed or final rule and the accompanying information 
from the agency’s regulatory impact analysis. In the face of this new information, 
it holds constant and controls for the overall trends in stock prices and looks at 
what change occurs within a short time after the release of news of the event under 
examination. As noted earlier, a statistically significant change in stock prices that 
occurs immediately after the public release of news of an event provides 
confidence that investors saw the event as having a meaningful impact on the future 
financial performance of the companies included in the analysis. When such an 
immediate change is sustained over another day or two, this implies, generally 
speaking, a stronger and more-than-fleeting effect. 
 For each of the three principal regulations associated with the “war on coal” 
narrative, we used one- to three-day event windows to analyze three key events 
in their development: the announcement of each proposed rule, the 
announcement of each final rule, and the relevant Supreme Court decision for 
each. The vast majority of these event-window combinations yielded no 
statistically significant changes in stock prices in response to the regulatory 
events. If we look at the results that might be said in principle to provide the 
strongest support for a market response to these regulatory developments, we 
find that only four events across the three regulations yielded any statistically 
significant result on day one—and in all of these instances, there exists reason to 
question how meaningfully these results can support the regulatory “war on coal” 
narrative. With CSAPR, the only event showing a statistically significant day-
one abnormal return was the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the rule—but 
coal stocks gained, rather than lost, as would have been expected from claims of 
a “war on coal.”189 With MATS, the announcement of the Supreme Court 
decision faulting the way EPA had justified its rule did yield a statistically 
significant positive abnormal return on day one—but it was followed on both 
days two and three with statistically significant negative abnormal returns.190 
The proposed MATS rule also showed statistically significant returns on the first 
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day following its release, but these returns were positive—again, opposite what 
would be expected from claims about a “war on coal.” Now, the release of the 
final CPP did yield statistically significant negative returns on both days one and 
two; however, these results cannot be taken to imply anything about the market’s 
reaction to CPP because a major coal firm bankruptcy occurred on the very same 
day the final rule was announced.191 
When these seemingly “best-case” responses to regulatory events are 
compared with the market responses to bankruptcies in the coal industry, it 
becomes still clearer what is lacking in the observed market reactions to the “war 
on coal” rules. Out of the five bankruptcies analyzed, three resulted in immediate 
day-one statistically significant negative returns.192 (A fourth yielded marginally 
significant negative returns within the first two days.)193 Over the entire three-
day event window, the returns were negative for each of the five bankruptcies, 
and three of these five were statistically significant.194 By contrast, only two of 
the nine regulatory events resulted in a statistically significant abnormal return 
across the entire three-day event window—and, perhaps tellingly, one of these 
ran in the direction opposite of expectations (MATS proposed rule), and the other 
occurred on the same day as the Alpha bankruptcy (CPP final rule).195 
The fact that we find much clearer and more consistent reactions in response 
to bankruptcies provides a degree of assurance that our lack of comparable 
findings with respect to the “war on coal” regulations is not merely an artifact of 
our empirical methods. Nevertheless, we did use a second statistical method in a 
further effort to ferret out market effects that might have been consistent with the 
regulatory “war on coal.” That second method—a difference-in-differences 
analysis—compared changes in coal stock prices to changes in natural gas stock 
prices, with the idea that what is bad for the coal industry would probably be 
good for the natural gas industry, and vice versa. By benchmarking coal stock 
prices not just against their own trends but also against trends in natural gas 
prices, we may well even have found a measure that would be biased in favor of 
finding effects consistent with the “war on coal” narrative. After all, changes in 
the coal industry might be more likely to be significant when compared with 
changes in the natural gas industry, which should move in the opposite direction. 
Despite this potential bias in favor of the “war on coal” account, only one out of 
the eighteen difference-in-differences analyses we conducted on the “war on 
coal” regulations yielded a statistically significant result.196 By comparison, 
every one of our six difference-in-differences results for national elections was 
statistically significant and in alignment with expectations.197 
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 At this point, it might be asked whether our failure to find any comparable 
results supportive of the rhetoric of the “war on coal” could stem from factors 
other than market disinterest in the key regulatory events. For example, perhaps 
the financial effects of the applicable regulations were somehow factored into 
coal firms’ stock prices long before the regulatory events in our study were even 
announced. In light of the statistically significant day-two returns after the 
release of the CAP in 2013, for example, it might be wondered whether that 
earlier event was the moment when the market priced in the negative effects from 
the CPP, even though the latter would not be proposed for another year.198 
Perhaps in other similar ways the news of impending CSAPR and MATS rules 
leaked to the market earlier, and thus the effects of these rules on the coal industry 
were already factored into stock prices by the time they were proposed. For three 
principal reasons, we do not find such alternative speculations provide a 
convincing explanation for the results of our analysis. 
 First, even though stock markets can and do take the possibility of future 
events into account, the occurrence of an event still can provide new information 
that affects stock prices further. For example, every time an election is held, the 
markets already know in advance, come election day, that one of two candidates 
will win—and yet the declaration of a winner still brings with it something new, 
namely certainty, which can affect stock prices. The same can be said of 
regulations. Even following the release of CAP, the CPP was far from certain 
until it was released. Moreover, the release of a proposed or final rule gives 
markets new information in terms of the actual regulatory language contained in 
these documents. The regulatory events that we studied—announcements of 
proposed and final rules—were each accompanied by the release of new 
information about the specific details of the regulatory proposal or decision. 
Second, we have no reason to think that regulatory impacts would have been 
pre-factored by the market only for the “war on coal” regulations but not for 
other regulations. As we noted in Part II, other researchers have found abnormal 
returns in similar event studies of different regulations.199 We even found 
significant abnormal returns with coal stocks in the immediate aftermath of the 
proposed stream protection rule and related regulatory events that directly 
affected coal mining operations, even though these regulations never played any 
meaningful role in the “war on coal” narrative.200 We generally just failed to find 
clear and consistent significant results associated with the clean air rules that 
were the real bogeyman in the rhetoric of a regulatory “war on coal.”201 
Finally, and most importantly, the market had absolutely no reason in 
advance to factor in the Supreme Court’s stay of the CPP. It is simply implausible 
to think that the market had factored in an entirely unprecedented event that 
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surprised even lawyers involved in the case.202 Moreover, if one assumes arguendo 
that negative financial effects from the proposed CPP rule had already been 
factored into coal stock prices due to CAP, that would only provide greater reason 
to expect positive returns from the Supreme Court’s stay. If the effects of a 
regulation were already built into and depressing the value of coal company share 
prices, then a totally surprising decision halting that regulation from taking effect, 
as well as signaling its likely demise, should have positively affected share prices 
for coal firms. Overall, if the regulatory “war on coal” were the existential threat 
to the industry that critics claimed, then the Court’s shocking stay should have 
clearly and immediately boosted coal company stock prices—but it did not.203 
Perhaps the most plausible explanation for our results stems from the 
overwhelming effects of lower natural gas prices on the demand for coal. The 
“war on coal” regulations, recall, did not directly regulate the coal industry; they 
regulated the electric utility industry, thereby increasing the costs to operate old 
coal-powered electricity plants and thus decreasing the likelihood that utilities 
would keep these plants running or replace them with new coal-powered 
electricity plants. Yet we fail to see evidence from the reactions of the stock 
market that would be consistent with the expected effects of an indirect reduction 
in the demand for coal induced by these regulations. What we do see around the 
same time are dramatically decreasing natural gas prices that were already 
driving coal company decisions to close down aging coal-powered plants and 
replace them with natural gas.204 Given the strong preexisting and ongoing 
competitive pressures from natural gas driving down the demand for coal, 
perhaps whatever additional effects on coal demand coming from regulations 
imposed on electric utilities were viewed as de minimis. In other words, if there 
was any proverbial war going on, the mortal wound may have already been 
inflicted by the natural gas industry, such that any additional (regulatory) wound 
did not make much, if any, difference to investors.205 
But then one might ask: What accounts for the negative market reaction to 
the Paris Agreement?206 By December 2015, when the agreement was 
announced, stock market investors fully recognized the substantial decline in 
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demand for coal in the face of cheaper alternative sources of energy. If a “second-
wound” hypothesis were plausible, why did the market respond to the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement? In fact, that market response was also one of the stronger 
ones we observed: a statistically significant decline in coal share prices 
immediately followed the accord’s announcement and a marginally significant 
decline in the difference-in-differences analysis. This decline seems all the more 
curious in light of the absence of any statistically significant positive returns 
eighteen months later in the wake of President Trump’s announcement of his 
intended withdrawal from the agreement.207 Yet, rather than a curiosity, these 
results may actually be consistent with the “second-wound” hypothesis. With 
domestic market demand from coal already rapidly in decline due to low natural 
gas prices, policy actions affecting only domestic markets—such as EPA 
regulations and the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement—would be 
expected to have little incremental effect on demand for coal. An industry dying 
from a decline in domestic demand, though, may at least have one lifeline 
available to it in the form of exports to foreign markets. By some accounts, that 
appears to be what coal firms and their investors had been banking on for the 
future of the industry.208 The signing of the Paris Agreement, however, signaled 
that the demand for coal by other countries around the world would also be on 
the decline. In the end, the divergent market responses to the signing of the Paris 
Agreement and the announced U.S. withdrawal could be quite consistent with 
investors viewing regulation as largely irrelevant to domestic demand while still 
at one time possessing optimism over a future with coal exports. 
Our purpose here, of course, has not been to develop and test a theory of 
stock market reactions to regulation as much as to investigate the plausibility of 
the “war on coal” narrative. Without a doubt, the U.S. coal industry suffered a 
dramatic decline during the Obama administration. Coinciding with coal’s 
demise was both the establishment of new environmental regulations and a 
dramatic decrease in natural gas prices. In our empirical analysis, we sought to 
isolate the effects of the key regulations that industry and its allies often blamed 
for the industry’s demise,209 but we found no convincing evidence that investors 
saw systematic effects from regulation consistent with the “war on coal” 
narrative. Granted, it is always possible that further analysis might yield other 
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/573a19c3d43643e5b2d961b46cd99c67. On the outlook for coal exports more generally, see Houser et 
al., supra note 31, at 39 (noting that “in recent years” China “provided a growing market for US coal 
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insights. We also recognize, of course, that any study of stock prices necessarily 
cannot speak to effects on privately held firms. Yet on the basis of all we have 
been able to analyze, it would appear that, rather than seeing regulators as 
inflicting substantial harm on the coal industry, the stock market treated the key 
regulatory events essentially as irrelevancies. With a serious economic war 
taking place between the coal industry and its market competitors, EPA’s 
regulatory agenda appears to have constituted at most a minor skirmish. 
B. The “War on Coal” and the Overstatement of Regulatory Impacts
A conclusion that investors did not see air pollution regulations to be a
major financial concern will seem surprising, especially given the vociferous 
complaints leveled in the political sphere by opponents of these regulations.210 
Yet on reflection, such a conclusion probably is not entirely surprising after all. 
Other research actually shows that environmental regulation has had only small 
effects on coal production and, more generally, that such regulation has not 
played a major role in terms of industrial competitiveness or levels of 
employment across the economy. 
As noted in Part I, other empirical studies have used different methods and 
data to discern how much, if at all, air pollution regulations imposed on coal-
power electricity plants explain the overall falloff in demand for coal.211 In one 
study, a team of economists based at Harvard University conducted both (1) a 
longitudinal analysis of state-level data on the share of electricity generated by 
coal based on the presence of cross-state air pollution rules, such as CSAPR and 
the MATS rule, and (2) a separate event study of plant closures in response to 
MATS.212 Using the results of these analyses, they decomposed the overall 
changes in coal production from 2008–2016, estimating that only 6 percent of 
coal’s decline could be attributed to air pollution regulations.213 What, then, 
“predominately” drove the coal industry’s decline?214 The “major driver of the 
decline”—which explained 92 percent of the decline in coal production—was 
the decreased price of natural gas.215 
In a second study, Columbia University researchers assumed for sake of 
analysis that all closures of coal plants in the years between 2011 and 2016 
stemmed from regulatory burdens, but they still concluded that, even under such 
210. For discussion of the complaints against these air pollution rules, see supra notes 61–62, 67,
166–67 and accompanying text. 
211. In addition to the studies of the coal industry discussed in the text, another major study found
that in the 2000-2015 period environmental regulation had little financial impact on electricity-generating 
plants powered with coal. Joshua Linn & Kristen McCormack, The Roles of Energy Markets and 
Environmental Regulation in Reducing Coal-Fired Plant Profits and Electricity Sector Emissions, 50 
RAND J. ECON. 733, 736 (2019) (finding that “factors other than environmental regulation explain most 
of the decline in the profits of coal-fired plants and the resulting retirements”).   
212. Coglianese et al., supra note 33, at 64–74.
213. Id. at 56–57.
214. Id. at 57.
215. Id. at 56–57.
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a strong assumption, no more than 3.9 percent of the drop in coal production 
during that period could have been attributable to regulation.216 They also used 
a version of a model developed by EIA to forecast the likely effects of a rollback 
of the CPP and a range of other environmental policies; however, they found that 
these changes, even if all of them were adopted and even if natural gas prices 
increased at rates higher than current government forecasts predict, would never 
bring coal production back to anywhere close to its peak levels prior to the 
Obama administration.217 From their analysis, “[t]he bottom line is that for the 
next few years, natural gas prices and, to a lesser extent, renewable energy costs 
will play a far greater role in determining U.S. coal consumption than President 
Trump’s deregulatory agenda.”218 
It may well be that, at the time that new air pollution regulations were in 
development during the Obama administration, sophisticated investors already 
understood what researchers have since documented: The effects of decreasing 
prices of natural gas overwhelm any effects of the regulations.219 For an industry 
already mortally wounded by its economic competition, any second wound 
inflicted by regulation may have amounted to little more than a cut on the finger. 
More broadly, the results of our analysis fit within a larger pattern of 
overstated claims about the negative economic effects of regulation, especially 
when made by industry representatives and politicians. One such claim made by 
some industry lobbyists and Republican politicians grows out of analysis 
commissioned by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) purporting 
to show that regulation imposes about $2 trillion in annual costs to the 
economy—roughly equivalent to dropping the entire state of New York out of 
the U.S. economy.220 But as others have explained, the basis for this assertion 
suffers from numerous methodological problems that contribute to a vastly 
overstated assertion.221 In commenting on an earlier, similar study by the same 
authors as the NAM-funded report, legal scholar Cass Sunstein noted that the 
claim is “deeply flawed and should not be relied on as a basis for quantifying 
216. Houser et al., supra note 31, at 22.
217. Id. at 38–39.
218. Id. at 39.
219. See supra notes 48, 216, 217 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the key role played 
by competition from natural gas in the coal industry’s demise, see Roman Mendelevitch et al., The Death 
Spiral of Coal in the U.S.: Will Changes in U.S. Policy Turn the Tide?, 19 CLIMATE POL’Y 1310, 1320 (2019) 
(noting that, “in the U.S. electricity sector, coal suffers less from climate and other environmental regulation 
and more from lower competitiveness compared to recently built gas-fired power plants and renewables”); 
Karin Kirk, The “War on Coal” Myth, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (July 15, 2019), https://
www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/07/the-war-on-coal-myth/ (“Are environmental regulations and 
fringe litigation to blame for coal’s downturn? In short, the answer is no. The real answer comes down to 
simple economics . . . . [C]oal has been upstaged by cheaper alternatives”). 
220. See, e.g., Crain & Crain, supra note 3.
221. See, e.g., MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44348, METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE 
TOTAL COST OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (2016) (methodically reviewing concerns with the Crain and 
Crain estimate); Parker, supra note 3 (discussing the “flawed methodology” underlying the Crain and 
Crain estimate). The $2 trillion per year claim is not one of net costs either; it leaves out the benefits of 
regulation. 
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regulatory costs.”222 Economist Austan Goolsbee put it still more succinctly, 
calling the claim “utterly erroneous.”223 
Of course, no one denies that specific regulations can and do sometimes 
impose substantial costs on industry—even if they also deliver substantial 
benefits to society at the same time. But getting precise, reliable estimates of the 
negative ramifications of all regulations across the entire U.S. economy, or even 
all regulations within a particular substantive area of regulation, can be difficult. 
Still, credible research does exist on the effects of environmental regulation as a 
general matter. Specifically, this research considers the impacts of environmental 
regulation on industrial competitiveness and on employment. With respect to 
both of these impacts, existing research tends to find the negative ramifications 
of regulation relatively modest. 
For example, in one of the most extensive reviews of the literature on the 
relationship between environmental regulation and the international 
competitiveness of U.S. industry, economist Adam Jaffe and several colleagues 
conclude that “[o]verall, there is relatively little evidence to support the 
hypothesis that environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on 
competitiveness.”224 They report that “studies attempting to measure the effect 
of environmental regulation on net exports, overall trade flows, and plant-
location decisions have produced estimates that are either small, statistically 
insignificant, or not robust to tests of model specification.”225 One of the main 
reasons for their finding was that, by and large, “the cost of complying with 
federal environmental regulation is a relatively small fraction of total cost of 
production.”226 Subsequent research has tended to continue to show only 
relatively modest impacts of environmental regulation on U.S. industry’s 
competitiveness in a global marketplace.227 
Similarly, the overall effects of environmental regulation on employment 
levels in the United States appear at best quite modest, to the extent that they 
amount to anything at all perceptible in the aggregate. In one of the earliest 
222. How Best to Advance the Public Interest?: Hearing Before the S. Comm on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 220 (2011) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Administrator, Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs). 
223. Austan Goolsbee, A 21st Century Regulatory System, WHITE HOUSE (June 23, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse. archives.gov/realitycheck/blog/2011/06/23/21st-century-regulatory-system. 
224. Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S.
Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell Us?, 33 J. ECON. LIT. 132, 157 (1995); see also Richard 
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2041 (1993) 
(acknowledging that “most empirical studies have not established a strong causal association between” 
the financial demands of “stringent environmental regulation and [the] international competitiveness” of 
domestic industry). 
225. Jaffe et al., supra note 224, at 157–58.
226. Id. at 158.
227. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy, Frameworks for Evaluating Policy Approaches to Address the
Competitiveness Concerns of Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 70 NAT’L TAX J. 395, 398 (2017) 
(noting that “the empirical literature typically finds quite limited impacts of environmental regulations on 
international competitiveness”). 
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studies, economists Eli Berman and Linda Bui analyzed the effects of air 
pollution regulation on manufacturing jobs in Southern California, with its more 
stringent air pollution rules, and other parts of the country, finding no substantive 
or statistically significant effects.228 Economist Richard Morgenstern and his 
colleagues have examined four major industrial sectors throughout the United 
States and have found no substantively or statistically significant association 
between spending by firms on compliance with environmental regulations and 
levels of employment.229 
Economist Michael Greenstone has compared air quality regions in 
attainment status with those in nonattainment (the latter being subject to greater 
regulation), finding an average of about 40,000 fewer jobs per year among the 
facilities located in nonattainment regions. To place this finding in some context, 
consider that one to two million people can be laid off from their jobs every month, 
even in normal economic times.230 More importantly, Greenstone’s analysis could 
not distinguish between jobs actually being eliminated versus jobs instead being 
shifted from higher regulated areas of the country to lower regulated areas.231 
Without question, regulation can sometimes affect the viability of some 
companies, just as it can help other businesses, such as those that supply pollution 
control technology. But in the aggregate, the research on environmental 
regulation does not support the view of regulation as a massive job killer. Indeed, 
“what we know about the relationship between regulation and employment 
contrasts strikingly with the grandiose claims found in contemporary political 
debate about either dramatic job-killing or job-creating effects of regulation.”232 
Based on the broader body of empirical research on regulation, there exists 
“little reason to expect that U.S. economic woes can be solved by reforming the 
regulatory process.”233 Our findings in this paper raise the possibility that stock 
market investors reached a similar conclusion about the economic woes afflicting 
the coal industry. 
C. Scapegoats and Saviors: Implications for Regulatory Law and Policy 
Our findings, combined with the results of other studies, also suggest 
immediate implications for what can be expected from current reforms to 
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Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures, 110 J. 
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environmental regulation. The Trump administration, for example, has rescinded 
the CPP and replaced it with a new regulatory regime that delegates much 
regulatory authority to states to set emissions standards.234 It has also proposed 
additional deregulatory efforts, such as scaling back environmental permitting 
requirements to make it easier to allow the construction of new coal-fired power 
plants.235 Yet these deregulatory efforts do not appear to have boosted market 
expectations about coal companies’ profitability.236 At least eleven coal 
companies have declared bankruptcy since the start of the Trump administration, 
and more than fifty coal plants have shut down.237 According to one estimate, 
twice as much coal-fired electrical generation shut down in Trump’s first two 
years than Barack Obama’s first four.238 If coal is to be rescued by the Trump 
administration—if it even can be—then it seems that doing so will require more 
than regulatory rollbacks. This realization may help explain why the Trump 
administration has taken additional, even if less visible, steps to propose 
subsidies to the coal industry.239 Regulatory reform by itself appears insufficient 
to resuscitate an industry dying from economic competition. 
234. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 
84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
235. See Benjamin Storrow, This Section Buried in EPA’s Rule May Be the Most Important,
GOVERNORS’ WIND & SOLAR ENERGY COAL. (2018), http://governorswindenergycoalition.org/this-
section-buried-in-epas-rule-may-be-the-most-important/. 
236. Stephen Lee, Coal Stock Prices Barely Budge After Trump’s Coal-Boosting Plans,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Dec. 6, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-
energy/coal-stock-prices-barely-budge-after-trumps-coal-boosting-plan.  
237. See, e.g., Irina Ivanova, For the First Time, the U.S. Got More Electricity From Renewables
Than Coal, CBS NEWS (June 27, 2019, 1:28 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/renewable-energy-
electricity-surpasses-coal-in-us-for-the-first-time/ (on plant closings); Daniel Moritz-Rabson, Eleven Coal 
Companies Have Filed for Bankruptcy Since Trump Took Office, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 30, 2019, 2:36 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/eight-coal-companies-have-filed-bankruptcy-since-trump-took-office-
1468734 (on bankruptcies); Ben Genman, Coal Bankruptcies Are Piling Up, AXIOS (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.axios.com/coal-bankruptcies-are-piling-up-453158be-2f06-4f33-aa30-d1f8ecc842ec.html 
(on bankruptcies); Jeremy Hill, Blackhawk Files Chapter 11, Joins List of Bankrupt Coal Miners, 
BLOOMBERG (July 19, 2019, 4:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-19/
blackhawk-files-chapter-11-joins-list-of-bankrupt-coal-miners (on bankruptcies); see generally Jonathan 
Chait, Trump Has Lost His War on the War on Coal, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 18, 2019), 
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/02/trump-tva-climate-change-coal.html (discussing declining coal 
jobs and contracting industry, despite President Trump’s attempt to revive the coal industry). 
238. Erik Sherman, Coal Power Plant Shutdowns Surge Under Trump, FORTUNE MAG. (Jan. 14,
2019, 9:04 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/01/14/coal-power-plants-trump/. 
239. For examples of these less visible policies—such as subsidies—see supra notes 158–62 and
accompanying text. In addition, as the last of the coal companies contributing to the union pension fund 
for mineworkers used bankruptcy to shed pension obligations, President Trump signed bipartisan 
legislation in December 2019 to offset the industry’s retreat by authorizing the use of funds originally set 
aside for federal mine reclamation to keep the pension fund afloat. See H.R. 1865, 116th Cong. 558 (2019) 
(signed Dec. 2019); UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA: CURRENT LEGISLATION, http://umwa.org/
policy-politics/current-legislation/ (last visited June 3, 2020); Congress Reaches Deal to Prop Up Coal 
Miners’ Pension Fund, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.post-gazette. 
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A broader implication follows from our work. In any area of law and 
regulation, there is value in treating with some skepticism the rhetorical claims that 
business leaders and their political boosters make.240 If financial markets do not 
appear to exhibit signs consistent with a regulatory war on a particular industry, 
then policy makers should have little reason to take that industry’s claims seriously 
when making regulatory decisions. Government agencies should instead make 
regulatory policy decisions on the basis of careful regulatory impact analyses 
grounded in reliable evidence—an important but sometimes still debated principle 
for effective regulatory decision making.241 Courts should similarly be especially 
attentive when reviewing deregulatory actions under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard, ensuring that agencies have not overstated the positive economic effects 
to industry expected to follow from specific regulatory changes.242 
Regulators, courts, and the public have particular reason to view skeptically 
any claims of the mortal effects from regulation that business leaders make when 
their firms struggle in the face of new competition or other unfavorable economic 
conditions. When businesses start to fail, the members of these firms’ 
management teams have ample incentive to shift the blame from themselves to 
someone or something else. After all, business failures result in serious, negative 
repercussions for investors and workers, as well as their family members and 
communities. Failing businesses short their workers’ pay, decline to contribute 
to pensions and health care funds, and renege on community financial 
commitments—not to mention ultimately shut down operations and lay off 
workers.243 It takes courage and honesty for leaders to accept responsibility for 
concealing distributional policy making in tax expenditures and subsidies—a phenomenon that Suzanne 
Mettler calls the “submerged state.” SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2011). 
240. Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 288 (2004) (noting that, although firms are often in a position to 
have better information than government agencies, “[r]egulators should certainly not rely on all, or perhaps 
even most, of the information volunteered by industry”). 
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regard to the question of requiring that agencies conduct benefit-cost analysis of their most economically 
significant rules. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005) (objecting to the monetization of certain 
benefits, such as the saving of human life); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF 
REGULATORY PROTECTION (2003) (arguing that benefit-cost analysis is an important component of sound 
policy decision making); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 9 (2011) 
(defending benefit-cost analysis as a means to avoid undue emphasis on compliance costs and insufficient 
attention to regulatory benefits); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The 
Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986) (raising institutional concerns about 
White House oversight of agency rulemaking). 
242. On the arbitrary and capricious standard, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) and Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Courts should, of course, also 
ensure that regulators have taken into account any loss of benefits that might follow the relaxation or 
modification of regulations. 
243. The loss of jobs has been acutely and profoundly felt in the coal mining industry. In 1985, the
industry employed more than 170,000 workers; today, that number is closer to about 50,000. U.S. BUREAU 
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the scarcity and suffering that follows a business collapse. Cognitive dissonance 
would lead even empathic managers to want to deflect responsibility. The 
anticipated hostility and anger that can be unleashed by workers, investors, and 
community leaders also give managers reason to find a scapegoat.244 That 
scapegoat needs to be someone other than the failing firms’ business competitors 
too. After all, admitting that competitors beat out a business (or even an entire 
industry) is just another way of admitting that the managers of the losing firm (or 
industry) failed to succeed in the market game. 
When searching for someone or something else to blame, business leaders 
and politicians find government regulation an easy target.245 Regulators are a bit 
like the referees in a sports game—and anyone with passing familiarity with 
sports knows that a losing team and its fans can readily blame the referee for 
their loss.246 Of course, a regulatory agency is more than just a referee, but the 
policies adopted by an entity such as EPA are outside the control of the 
management team, which means that blaming industry failure on regulation 
imputes no responsibility to managers themselves. It cuts off the argument that 
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incapable of defending itself. Moreover, the word’s connotation is hardly revered by most people. Cary 
Coglianese, Building a Better World: A Framework for Making Regulation Work, in MAKING 
REGULATION WORK (Cary Coglianese, forthcoming). The negative connotations surrounding the word 
“regulation,” which no doubt exhibit a certain ideological valence, have led some commentators to 
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the firm simply did not compete well enough in the market. It avoids the need to 
acknowledge that other firms or another industry—say, the natural gas industry, 
with its falling prices due to technological innovations—had simply done a better 
job of competing in the marketplace. Regulation can be easily framed as an 
invading force that distorts competition, tilts the playing field, and causes 
industry failure.247 
Regulated businesses’ incentives go still further beyond engaging in cheap 
talk and scapegoating. They have another strategic reason to employ 
antiregulatory rhetoric, even when it is overstated: It can help advance other, 
larger policy goals. Even if coal executives, industry association lobbyists, and 
politicians knew that CSAPR, MATS, and CPP (or any of their repeals) would 
be unlikely to change the underlying business fundamentals facing the coal 
industry, blaming regulations for killing the coal industry nevertheless moves to 
the forefront of political discourse the need for government relief. Blaming 
utility-plant regulation potentially puts on more favorable terrain political 
demands about other policies—including subsidies, tax benefits, and federal 
leases.248 Normally, it might be difficult to convince a president or an 
administration to take up the cause of bailing out particular industrial plants. Yet 
by investing in a narrative that government policy has decimated its viability, 
and then succeeding in making that narrative central on the macropolitical stage, 
the coal industry and its political boosters may have made it more likely that 
politicians would support subsidies and tax benefits that might more effectively 
prop up dying firms, at least for a time. Donald Trump accepted the “war on 
coal” narrative and used it as a central part of his successful presidential 
campaign, so it comes as little surprise that his administration has given serious 
consideration to granting subsidies to the coal industry—a controversial but 
consequential prospect for any industry that is failing to compete in the 
marketplace. It is also not surprising that other elected officials propagating the 
regulatory “war on coal” narrative have also sought to build support for direct 
subsidies and tax benefits. The latter are an easier sell politically when they aim 
 
 247.  For example, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, in a public statement endorsing 
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to help an industry that has “just gone through the God-awfullest war on coal for 
the last eight years prior to President Trump.”249 
Political leaders have their own independent incentives to push a regulatory 
“war” narrative. When they define problems afflicting an industry as ones created 
by excessive regulation, they can more easily make themselves look like saviors—
standing up for workers by fighting against the scapegoat of burdensome 
regulation.250 Although Presidents do reap credit when the overall economy is 
doing well and incur the public’s blame when it is not, in reality there is only so 
much any administration can do to affect the overall economy or to salvage an 
industry getting beat out by larger competitive forces. Fundamental changes in the 
economy or to a major industry are usually brought about by technological 
innovation, global events, and other macroeconomic forces outside the day-to-day 
control of the White House, or even Congress. Regulation is an advantageous 
target to would-be political saviors because a regulatory fight is actually one that 
politicians can wage.251 The Trump administration certainly cannot reverse the 
technological developments that brought about the shale revolution and the 
plummeting cost of natural gas. Changing regulatory law is feasible, while 
changing the economic law of supply and demand is not. Furthermore, an 
administration can make a big public display of making regulatory changes in a 
way that is simply not as politically acceptable to do when it comes to doling out 
subsidies to industry or giving away targeted tax credits to corporations. Practically 
speaking, then, regulatory change is the best way, if not at times the only realistic 
way, for political candidates and elected officials to trumpet themselves as the 
saviors of a dying industry. Even if the payoff in terms of real economic benefits 
to a dying industry might be limited or nonexistent, regulatory reform still can 
deliver symbolic outcomes that are helpful to politicians. 
None of this is to suggest that every business leader or politician who has 
perpetuated the “war on coal” narrative has acted insincerely or deliberately to 
promote their own self-interests. The strategic, self-interested reasons for 
blaming regulation may at times simply reinforce, at least for some leaders, an 
ingrained psychological self-defense mechanism that accentuates biases against 
regulation.252 Belief in the “war on coal” is convenient—and perhaps even 
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 250.  For example, in his statement of support for legislation to keep the national mineworker pension 
fund afloat, Senate Majority Leader McConnell not only blamed regulation, but he sounded like a savior, 
emphasizing how he was “personally” involved and had “proudly introduced our bill . . . to help solve this 
looming pension cris[i]s.” Manchin, McConnell, and Capito, supra note 247. 
 251.  Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 185, at 10 (discussing how politicians who want to “do 
something” often turn to making legal changes even when they are merely symbolic gestures).  
 252.  Social science research indicates that at least some forms of racial scapegoating tend to increase 
almost automatically when economic conditions falter. Emily C. Bianchi et al., Reexamining the Link 
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accepted unconsciously. Especially for someone already predisposed to a 
political ideology that opposes regulation, a decline in coal production 
coterminous with policy initiatives by the Obama administration may have 
activated a confirmation bias that only reinforced the “war on coal” narrative.253 
But acknowledging that the psychological possibility of implicit tendencies to 
accept a regulatory war narrative does not diminish the need for policy decision 
makers to exercise caution. Regulatory officials and courts should be especially 
on guard against the possibility of deregulatory overreaction when any major 
industry’s fortunes are in decline.254 
One final point bears mentioning. Just as antiregulatory rhetoric should not 
be taken at face value, the assumption that regulation of any kind will always 
achieve its ultimate aims seems also deserving of suspicion. We note that 
President Obama, seeking to underscore his administration’s commitment to 
combating climate change, appears to have been willing at times to accept the 
“war on coal” narrative, perhaps no less than coal industry executives.255 Yet 
even if some in the Obama administration desired to drive the coal industry out 
of existence, the administration’s signature climate initiatives appear to have 
added little to no further momentum to the decline of the coal industry—at least, 
that would be another plausible inference from our failure to see clear evidence 
During Recessions, 29 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1584 (2018). We know of no research that similarly investigates in 
any systematic way the relationship between economic conditions and attitudes about regulation. 
However, survey research does show that support for free trade policy declines when individuals in 
import-related industries are laid off from work. Edward D. Mansfield, et al., Effects of the Great 
Recession on American Attitudes Toward Trade, 49 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 37 (2016). 
253. On confirmation bias generally, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 81
(2013). We accept that anyone—including stock market investors—can be susceptible to confirmation 
bias or other cognitive limitations. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); 
RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 205–53 (2015). Yet 
market analysts and investors do not have the kind of incentives that industry leaders and politicians have 
to accept overstated claims about regulatory “wars.” Quite the contrary, investors with money on the line 
have incentives to investigate and understand how regulatory and other events will actually affect the 
financial performance of publicly traded firms. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. In this regard, 
it seems at least somewhat ironic that both EPA and the electric utility industry later came to agree, when 
the agency went to rescind the Clean Power Plan, that this climate rule would have resulted in very little, 
if any, meaningful economic effects, given the underlying market fundamentals that are leading utilities 
to shift to natural gas. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, and the 
Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units 2-4–
2-7, 2-12–2-13 (June 2019); Quinlan J. Shea, III, Vice President, Environment & Natural Resources,
Edison Electric Institute, Comments on “Proposed Rule: Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units: Emission Guideline Implementing
Regulations; New Source Review Program” 4 (Oct. 2018). 
254. Carrigan & Coglianese, supra note 185, at 10–15. Recent scholarship has suggested that, under
highly limited circumstances, regulators ought to take into account broad macroeconomic considerations, 
such as when the economy as a whole is in a deep recession and interest rates have already been lowered 
virtually to zero. YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS 
(2019); see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, 34 YALE J. REG. 
857 (2017). Whatever the merits of these arguments, they apply only in response to economy-wide 
conditions, not to the continued viability of a particular industry.  
255. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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in investors’ behavior consistent with a “war on coal.” For those who are 
concerned about climate change, this might imply that the Obama 
administration’s regulatory efforts were too timid. Some scholars have indeed 
suggested that the CPP, even as it offered great symbolic purchase to the public, 
was in some ways a limited measure with critical design weaknesses.256 Our 
findings suggest that, whether a policy maker is concerned with regulation’s 
costs or with its benefits, it is always important to scrutinize claims about its 
effects. Regulatory policies, after all, can amount to symbolic gestures just as 
deregulatory ones can. 
CONCLUSION 
For much of the last decade, the coal industry’s decline has stood at the 
center of a national debate over government regulation in the United States. 
Some of the loudest voices in that debate have claimed that major rules that the 
Obama administration imposed on coal-powered electricity plants worked to the 
severe detriment of the coal industry.257 These regulations have even been said 
to have brought about a large decline in coal production during the last ten 
years.258 Yet notwithstanding industry leaders’ and politicians’ strong charges 
of a regulatory “war on coal,” we find no meaningful support from our analysis 
for placing responsibility for coal’s decline on environmental regulation.259 
Our research, the first to address how financial analysts and market 
participants assessed news of environmental regulation on the coal industry’s 
fortunes, may seem to yield puzzling results in light of the “war on coal” rhetoric. 
After all, if EPA’s Clean Power Plan was the signature battle in the “war on 
coal,” then surely the market would have responded positively to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s unprecedented stay of that rule. Yet, if anything, coal investors’ 
reaction to the Court’s decision was negative. Across a range of key regulatory 
events, the stock market appears to have failed time and again to respond in ways 
that would have confirmed industry leaders’ and their political allies’ confident 
“war on coal” story. 
It would even seem as if investors simply did not worry much about the 
regulatory “war on coal” narrative. Their main worry presumably centered on 
the bigger battle that the coal industry faced with its competitors in the natural 
gas sector. As such, investors may have figured out that natural gas had already 
sealed the industry’s doom long before the “war on coal” regulations could have 
any appreciable economic effects. Of course, investors did seem to worry about, 
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and respond to the news of, other events having potentially more immediate 
implications for the short-term profitability of coal firms, such as bankruptcies 
in the industry.260 But altogether, the lack of meaningful response of stock prices 
to major regulatory events is consistent with a view, supported by other evidence 
as well, that environmental regulations had little to do with the decline of coal 
production over the last decade. 
The findings reported here are also not surprising in light of a considerable 
body of research showing how little environmental regulations more generally 
seem to matter in shaping the international competitiveness of U.S. industry or 
affecting overall employment.261 Caution seems warranted whenever business 
leaders and politicians make regulation the scapegoat for economic woes and 
promise to save entire industries by rolling back regulations. After all, scapegoats 
and saviors operate in the world of political symbols. Symbolic appeals can serve 
the self-interest of business leaders and politicians, especially when a major 
industry finds itself in decline, but they will not help much when making 
meaningful public policy decisions. Government officials need to see regulatory 
scapegoating for what it is and seek to analyze all regulatory impacts with care, 
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